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Abstract: On August 11, 2011, during a year of protests
around the world, a group of activists tried to organize a
spontaneous protest against a San Francisco transit agency
through Twitter. Unbeknownst to them, the transit agency
had been informed of their plans, and planned to preempt
the protest. For the first time in the United States, a state
actor shuttered Internet access to prevent an anti-
government demonstration. It succeeded; the protest did not
materialize. Mere months after Egyptian dictator Hosni
Mubarak tried to silence the thousands in Tahrir Square who
wanted him gone, the agency known as the San Francisco
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) did the same.
As the Internet continues to augment traditional forms
of speech and protest through social media, it compels a
serious reconsideration of First Amendment jurisprudence.
The incident on August 11, however, highlights how the
public forum doctrine-which prescribes how much the
government may restrict speech on public property-is
absurd to apply in the Internet era.
This Article argues that the BART shutdown of cell
phone service, as shoehorned into the public forum doctrine,
serves as a perfect example of the doctrine's failings.
Examined conventionally, the shutdown was mere
enforcement of the government's existing restrictions on the
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limited public forum of the train platform. Examined
through the Internet forum, the shutdown was an unabashed
infringement of free speech rights in a designated open
public forum. No court would look at the incident through
the lens of two different forums; yet to select the
conventional method would be to ignore the protesters'
actual method of speech, which was through the Internet.
Instead, the shutdown should compel an overhaul of the
public forum doctrine, by dispensing with its convoluted and
poorly defined forum categories, minimizing its reliance on
governmental intent, and reconceptualizing what
"traditional" forums for speech should mean.
"Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants offlesh
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of lind. On
behalf of the future, I ask of the past to leave us alone. You are not
welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather....
Your legal concepts ofproperty, expression, identity, movement,
and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and
there is no matter here. "' John Perry Barlow
I. THE YEAR OF THE PROTEST
Mere hours before the nation would celebrate the anniversary of
its independence in 2011, Charles Hill was shot and killed by a police
officer working for the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART),
the city's commuter rail transit system. 2 Mr. Hill was a homeless man
who, according to police, "appear[ed] inebriated [and] was armed
with a bottle and [at least one] knife" in the Civic Center station.3
When Mr. Hill "[re]acted aggressively" toward the two police officers
1 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), http://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
2 Mr. Hill was shot on July 3, 2011, at 9:45 p.m. on a Sunday evening. Zusha Elinson &
Shoshana Walter, Latest BART Shooting Prompts New Discussion of Reforms, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.Com/2o11/o7/17/us/7bebart.html [hereinafter
Discussion of Reforms]. See also Zusha Elinson, Witness: Man Shot by BART Police Was
Not 'Running or Lunging' at Officers, BAY CITIZEN (July 6, 2011, 7:51 PM),
http://www.bayeitizen.org/transportation/story/witness-man-shot-bart-police-running
[hereinafter Man Shot by BART Police].
3 Discussion of Reforms, supra note 2. See also Zusha Elinson, Coroner IDs Man Shot by
BARTPolice, BAY CITIZEN (July 7, 2011, 4:40 PM),
http://www.bayeitizen.org/transportation/story/coroner-ids-man-shot-bart-police
[hereinafter Coroner].
[Vol. 10:1
GENG
approaching him, one officer shot him three times within 25 seconds
of arriving on the scene.4 The shooting, which occurred on a relatively
active platform moments after a train had disembarked passengers, 5
caused immediate backlash. 6 Eyewitnesses said Mr. Hill "just looked
like a drunk hippie" and that the police should have reached for a
Taser instead of a gun. 7
It was not the first time that a police officer had shot and killed a
man on the train platform,8 but members of the local community
vowed to ensure that this was the last time the BART police would use
such violent measures on the San Francisco transit system. A week
later, on July 11, 2011, activists "storm[ed] the platform[s] at BART's
Civic Center station," which delayed 95 different trains for up to 30
minutes.9 They demanded that BART dissolve its police department.1o
The protests effectively shut down the Civic Center, Powell Street, and
4 Discussion of Reforms, supra note 2; Coroner, supra note 3; Zusha Elinson, BART
Officer Killed Man 25 Seconds After Arriving on Scene, BAY CITIZEN (July 21, 2011, 7:10
PM), http://www.bayeitizen.org/bart -police-shooting/story/bart -officer -killed-man- 25-
seconds-after [hereinafter BART Officer Killed Man].
5 BARTable, Security Camera Video of Civic Center Platform 1 July 3,2011, YOuTUBE
(July 21, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/wath?v=R851Vf259BY. The BART police later
released security camera footage, showing that the officer who fired the fatal shots "had a
Taser in his belt," but did not reach for it. Id.; Zusha Elinson, BART Officer Killed Man,
supra note 4.
6 See Discussion of Reforms, supra note 2.
7Man Shot by BART Police, supra note 2.
8 In fact, "BART officers have shot and killed six people since the agency was founded in
1972; three of the shootings occurred [between 2008 and 2011]." Discussion of Reforms,
supra note 2. Most recently in 2009, an unarmed man named Oscar Grant was shot and
killed by a BART officer, who was subsequently found guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
See Violence After California Police Shooting Trial Verdict, BBC NEwS (July 9, 2010, 9:12
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10565543.
9 Zusha Elinson, BART Protest Snarls Evening Commute, BAY CITIZEN (July 11, 2011, 8:O9
PM), http://www.baycitizen.org/transportation/story/bart-protesters-snarl-evening-
commute [hereinafter BARTProtest Snarls Evening Commute]; Will Reisman, As
Criticism Mounts, BART Stays the Course, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 16, 2011,
http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/211/0o8/criticism-mounts-bart-stays-course. See
Manny Ortez, BART Civic Center Station shutdown/protest, YoUTUBE (July 11, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HDLAhUb6Vvc.
lo See BARTProtest Snarls Evening Commute, supra note 9.
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16th Street Mission stations-several of the system's most trafficked11-
as trains were ordered to proceed through without stopping.12 This
would be only the first of many protests that summer on the BART
platforms,13 and one of countless protests that would headline the
worldwide news that year.14 But, as history will likely show, the critical
difference between the protests of 2011 and those of yesteryear may be
that Internet-based social media fueled those protesters, allowing
them to be heard, to rally and organize supporters, and even to topple
governments.
In January 2011, tens of thousands of Egyptians occupied Cairo's
Tahrir Square for days that turned into weeks, demanding change to
the iron-fisted rule that President Hosni Mubarak had maintained
over the country for thirty years.15 Mubarak's initial response was to
send out "legions of black-clad riot police,"16 but the tear gas and
rubber bullets did not deter the protesters.17 They hijacked
1 In 2010, the Powell Street and Civic Center Stations were the third and fourth most
trafficked stations out of 44 total stations with 24,676 and 18,432 weekday average exits.
The 16th Street Mission Station was ninth most trafficked with 10,546 weekday average
exits. All three maintained a similar same number of exits in 2011. BARTAverage
Weekday Exits by Station, BAYAREA RAPID TRANSIT, available at
http://www.bart.gov/sites/default/files/does/FY%20Avg%20Wkdy%2oExits%20by%20St
ation.xlsx (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
12 Michael Cabanatuan, BARTAdmits Halting Cell Service to Stop Protests, S.F. CHRON.
(Aug. 12, 2011, 2:49 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/BART-admits-halting-cell-
service-to-stop-protests-2335114.php [hereinafter Halting Cell Service].
13 See Shawn Gaynor, Waves of Protest Pound at BART, Shutting Down Stations, S.F. BAY
GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2011, 7:35 PM), http://www.sfbg.Com/politiCs/2011/o8/15/waves-
protest-pound-bart-shutting-down-stations.
14 See John Harris, Global Protests: Is 2011 a Year That Will Change the World?, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2011, 3:00 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 ii/nov/15/global-protests- 2011-change-the- world.
15 Kareem Fahim & Mona El-Naggar, Violent Clashes Mark Protests Against Mubarak's
Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.Com/2O1/O1/26/world/middleeast/26egypt.html; Charles Levinson
& Matt Bradley, Egypt's Regime on the Brink: Mubarak Digs In as Mobs Battle Police,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2011, 12:O AM),
http://online.wsj.com/artile/SBI0001424o527487o39566o45761o9323492986438.html.
16 Levinson & Bradley, supra note 15.
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government vehicles and set fire to government buildings.18 As the
seemingly unstoppable protesters grew in force, even joined by many
of Mubarak's own police, the government shut off cell phone and
Internet access. 19 By doing so, Mubarak effectively extinguished one of
the activists' primary means of coordinating the protests. 20 The
international community, uncertain about how to respond to the
uprisings occurring in several Arab countries, feared that perhaps this
would quash the protesters' momentum once and for all.
Seven months later and 2,000 miles away, riots broke out in
Tottenham, North London after what began as a peaceful march
against the police, in reaction to the fatal shooting of an unarmed man
that had occurred days earlier.21 Over one hundred rioters set fire to
police cars, buses, and shops, and attempted to rush into the
18Id.
19 Id.; How the Internet Refused to Abandon Egypt: Authorities Take Entire Country
Offline, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 30, 2011, 10:55 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/artile-
1351904/Egypt-protests-Internet-shut-hackers-message-out.html.
20 The Internet had, over the last several years, been fomenting increasing dissent to the
Mubarak regime; "social media in general, and Facebook in particular, provided new
sources of information the regime could not easily control." Zeynep Tufekci & Christopher
Wilson, Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest: Observations
from Tahrir Square, 62 J. OF COMM. 363, 363-64 (2012). Tufekci and Wilson's 2012 survey
of about 1,ooo participants of the Tahrir Square protests found that "people learned about
the protests primarily through interpersonal communication through Facebook, phone
contact or face-to-face conversation." Id. at 363. "Facebook (28.3%) was by far the most
dominant means of hearing about the protests outside of face-to-face communication.
[T]exting ... was rarely the means by which someone first heard about the protests (o.8%),
even though it was used widely for sharing information about the protests (46%)." Id. at
370. See also Shereen El Gazzar, Lilly Vitorovich, & Ruth Bender, Egypt's Web, Mobile
Communications Severed, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2011, 4:58 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/artile/SB100014240527487039566045761o966116o6o4954.html;
Alexandra Dunn, Unplugging a Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt's January 25
Uprising, 35 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 15, 18-22 (2011) ('"The government chose to use any
means necessary to quell the communication components facilitating the uprising, and by
doing so, alienated the business community in Egypt, disproportionately impacted
apolitical citizens, and inadvertently increased international diplomatic attention on the
crisis as a result of the government's own response.").
21 Eight Officers Hurt as Riots Erupt, HARROW TIMES (Aug. 7, 2011, 3:16 AM),
http://www.harrowtimes.co.uk/uk-national-news/9182266.Eight-officers hurt as riot
s-erupt. But see Zack Whittaker, Two-thirds of Brits Support Facebook, Twitter
Shutdown in Future Riots, ZDNET.COM (Nov. 8, 2011),
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/london/two-thirds -of-brits-support-facebook-twitter-
shutdown-in-future-riots/728 ("Most Britons believe the web should be limited in times of
civil unrest. But not everybody agrees; particularly the younger generation.").
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Tottenham police station, armed with baseball bats, glass bottles filled
with gasoline, and "makeshift missiles."22 As the chaos continued,
United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron "consider[ed]
banning suspected rioters from [using] social media sites,"23 because
he believed the activists were "plotting violence, disorder and
criminality" through these channels.24 While it may have been
foreseeable for an oppressive Arab regime to suppress freedom of
expression, few would have imagined that a Western government
would seriously consider such an action.
Yet on August 11 that year, one month after the first BART protest,
the BART police preempted an initiative by organizers to stage a
larger protest, by shutting off cell phone service inside the Bay Area's
underground train stations.25 The method was effective: the
anticipated protest never materialized.26 The action, however,
immediately triggered a firestorm of criticism; in particular,
accusations that the BART police had violated the protesters' free
22 Sarah Bolesworth, Barry Neild, Peter Beaumont, Paul Lewis & Sandra Laville,
Tottenham in Flames as Riot Follows Protest, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2011),
http://wvww.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/o6/tottenham-riots-protesters-police. For
discussion of how to regulate Internet-based incitement of flash mobs, see Hannah
Steinblatt, Note, E-incitement: A Framework for Regulating the Incitement of Criminal
Flash Mobs, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753 (2012).
23 London Riots: David Cameron Considers Banning Suspected Looters From Twitter And
Facebook, DAILY MIRROR, Aug. 11, 2011, http://wwv.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/london-
riots-david-cameron-considers-184899.
24 Social Media Talks About Rioting 'Constructive,'BBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2011,11:31 PM),
http://www.bbe.co.uk/news/uk-14657456. In fact, after analyzing 2.5 million riot-related
Twitter messages, The Guardian concluded that the social media service had "mainly
[been] used to react to riots and looting," such as organizing street clean-up, rather than
inciting the violence. Paul Lewis, James Ball & Josh Halliday, Twitter Study Casts Doubts
On Ministers'Post-Riots Plan, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 24, 2011, 4:35 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/24/twitter-study-post-riot-plans. But cf. Chris
Taylor, London Riots: BlackBerry Messenger Used More Than Facebook or Twitter,
MASHABLE (Aug. 8, 2011), http://mashable.Com/2011/o8/o8/london-riots-blackberry-
messenger ("[I]t soon became clear that [BlackBerry Messenger] was by far the most
popular means for rioters to communicate."). See generally Josh Halliday, London Riots:
How BlackBerry Messenger Played a Key Role, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 8, 2011,
http://wvww.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/aug/o8/london-riots-facebook-twitter-
blackberry ("Police looking on Facebook and Twitter for signs of unrest spreading will have
missed out - they should have watched [BlackBerry Messenger].").
25 Halting Cell Service, supra note 12.
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speech rights under the First Amendment.27 This service disruption
marked the first time that a government actor in the United States
shut off Internet access in order to prevent an anti-government
demonstration2 3 Given the growing reliance on the Internet to
organize protests, and therefore the increasing likelihood that such
protests will be similarly counteracted by governments in the future, 29
27 See David Kravets, San Francisco Subway Shuts Cell Service to Foil Protest; Legal
Debate Ignites, WIRED.COM (Aug. 15, 2011, 3:15 PM),
http://www.wired.com/201n/08/subway-internet-shuttering ("[The] move by Bay Area
Rapid Transit authorities was greeted by an uproar of comparisons to Egypt and Libya....
Some constitutional scholars are likening BART's actions to an unlawful suppression of
First Amendment speech."); Eva Galperin, BART Pulls a Mubarak in San Francisco, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 12, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/20n/o8/bart-pulls-
mubarak-san-francisco. See discussion of the shutdown's aftermath, infra Part II.D.
28 Kravets, supra note 27.
29 One example of this happening globally is Libya. See Stacey Higginbotham, Libya, BART
and Tethering: Understanding the Web's Weak Points, GIGAOM (Aug. 22, 2011),
http://gigaom.com/broadband/libya-bart- and-tethering-understanding-the-webs-weak-
points ("We may think of Internet communication as this global network without borders,
but there are still plenty of geographical borders in place thanks to how countries
broadcast IP addresses and who owns the ISPs. For example in Libya, the state owns the
only telecommunications provider inside the country, giving the government freedom to
limit traffic both to the outside world and to areas inside the country."). Another example
is China. See James Fallows, "The Connection Has Been Reset," THE ATLANTIC (Mar.
2008), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/-ldquo-the-connection-
has -been-reset-rdquo/6650 ("In America, the Internet was originally designed to be free of
choke points, so that each packet of information could be routed quickly around any
temporary obstruction. In China, the Internet came with choke points built in. Even now,
virtually all Internet contact between China and the rest of the world is routed through a
very small number of fiber-optic cables that enter the country at one of three points: the
Beijing-Qingdao-Tianjin area in the north, where cables come in from Japan; Shanghai on
the central coast, where they also come from Japan; and Guangzhou in the south, where
they come from Hong Kong."). Even in the United States, there have been discussions to
give an "Internet 'kill switch' to President Barack Obama. Declan McCullagh, Renewed
Push to Give Obama an Internet 'Kill Switch', CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2011, 10:12 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/renewed-push-to-give-obama-an-internet-kill-switch.
When BART promulgated a new policy that would limit the circumstances when it
could shut down cell phone service, see infra Part II.E, BART's president Bob Franklin
said, "This policy, with input from the Federal Communications Commission, and the
American Civil Liberties Union, will serve as a pioneering model for our nation, as a
reference to other public agencies that will inevitably face similar dilemmas in the future."
Press Release, BART, Extraordinary Circumstances Only for Cell Phone Interruptions (last
updated Dec. 1, 2011, 1:18 PM), available at
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/20n/news20111201 [hereinafter Extraordinary
Circumstances Only].
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BART's shutdown of cell service brings to a head the uncertain fate of
the First Amendment and free speech rights in the Internet era.
Although free speech rights have already substantially evolved
during the first communications revolution in the 1930s with the
emergence of the radio, motion pictures, and mass publishing,3o the
Internet's unparalleled ease of communication further compels a
serious reconsideration of First Amendment jurisprudence.31 While
much of the scholarly discussion has been focused on addressing the
predicament of protecting free speech as conducted over the largely
privately-owned Internet,3 2 BART's shutdown of cell service presents a
30 See Samantha Barbas, Creating the Public Forum, 44 AKRON L. REv. 809, 809-8io
(2011) (describing "the development of the public forum doctrine in the context of a larger
story about the nation's efforts ... to come to terms with its first modern crisis of
communication.").
31 See generally, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003); Eric D. Paulsrud, Electronic Commerce in the
2lst Century: Article the First Amendment on the Internet: Challenges in a New Media, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1637 (2001); Robert Mine, Freedom of Speech on the Electronic
Village Green: Applying the First Amendment Lessons of Cable Television to the Internet,
6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1996); David Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the
Age of the Information Superhighway (Where Are the Public Forums On The Information
Superhighway?), 46 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1995).
32 That discussion has generally revolved around how to implicate private actors as
performing state functions such that they are subject to First Amendment restrictions
under the state action doctrine. See, e.g., Ronnie Cohen & Janine S. Hiller, Towards a
Theory of Cyberplace: A Proposalfor a New Legal Framework, 1o RICH. J.L. & TECH. 41,
41-43 (2003) ("On the one hand, the Supreme Court characterized the Internet as the
,most participatory form of mass speech yet developed,' while on the other hand, private
networks are staking out their claims to cyber territory and suing those who interfere with
their property rights.... [W]hile it is possible that the state's enforcement of trespass laws
might constitute the state action necessary to bring a speech claim in these cases, no such
state action is present where a private entity engages in discriminatory enforcement of
private terms of use."); Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace,
20 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 1115, 1116, 1135 (2005) ("In contrast to real space (which enjoys a
mixture of privately-and publicly-owned places in which speech occurs) ... speech in
cyberspace occurs almost exclusively within privately-owned places. The public/private
balance that characterizes real space and renders the First Amendment meaningful within
it is all but absent in cyberspace.... Individuals whose speech has been restricted by
private Internet actors have sought to extend the state action doctrine.., to private
Internet actors, and have attempted to subject such online speech regulations to First
Amendment scrutiny."); Philip F. Weiss, Note, Protecting a Right to Access Internet
Content: The Feasibility of Judicial Enforcement in a Non-neutral Network, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 383, 424-25 (2011) ("[T]he First Amendment is a protection against intrusion by the
government, not by private actors.... Nonetheless, there is an argument that ISPs may fall
directly within the parameters of the state action doctrine, in turn allowing for direct
constitutional enforcement.").
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different question altogether: how might a government actor-one
that has voluntarily provided Internet access-be subject to the First
Amendment's protections of free speech of its users? Cities, towns,
and other municipal actors have pushed for years to establish wireless
or broadband access for their residents,33 and while many have run
into resistance from the private sector 34 or encountered budgetary
problems, Internet access is now increasingly viewed as an essential
utility no different than electricity.35
This Article discusses how the BART cell phone service shutdown
has highlighted the First Amendment's incompatibility with free
speech on the Internet, and argues that the public forum doctrine is
unsustainable as society increasingly relies on the Internet for
communication. The public forum doctrine, which expects courts to
classify places for speech into one of four types of forums, is tortured
beyond recognition when applied to modern-day situations, in part
due to its historical reliance on physical places for speech where clear
boundaries may be drawn. Those classifications, rather than
simplifying the analysis, have instead become major obstacles to more
33 Reality Bites: American cities'plans for ubiquitous internet access are running into
trouble, ECONOMIST (Aug. 30, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/9726651; Mari
Sibley, Seattle Ends Free Wi-Fi, SMARTPLANET.COM (May 8, 2012),
http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/thinking-tech/seattle-ends-free-wAi-fi/11546. See, e.g.,
WIRELESS GOVERNMENT REPORT
http://w2i.com/resource-center/case-study/ease-study-search/p/type-continent (last
visited Mar. 29, 2014); MUNIWIRELESS, http://www.muniwireless.com (last visited Mar.
29, 2014).
34 Emily Badger, How the Telecom Lobby is Killing Municipal Broadband,
THEATLANTICCITIES.COM (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.theatlanticeities.com/technOlogy/2011/11/telecom-lobby-killing-municipal-
broadband/42o; Adi Robertson, South Carolina Passes Bill Restricting Municipal
Broadband, THE VERGE (June 30, 2012),
http://www.theverge.Com/2012/6/3o/3128235/south-carolina-municipal-broadband-bill.
35 Broadband access in the United States is "dismal" as compared to the rest of the world by
several measures. James Losey, Denial of Service: Don't Believe the Telecoms. Broadband
Access in the United States is Worse than You Think, SLATE.COM (Apr. 28, 2010, 7:03 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2olo/o4/denial of service.html.
In 2009, Congress asked the Federal Communications Commission to develop a "national
broadband plan" to address this problem. See National Broadband Plan: Connecting
America, BROADBAND.GOV, http://www.broadband.gov/plan/executive-summary (last
visited Mar. 29, 2014). The battle between the private broadband companies and
municipalities is reminiscent of the fight to make electricity a public utility in the 188os. D.
Stan O'Loughlin, Note, Preemption or Bust: Fear and Loathing in the Battle Over
Broadband, 28 CARDOzO L. REV. 479, 482-85 (2006).
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fluid development of the jurisprudence in light of rapidly changing
technology.
Part II of this Article lays out the background and facts
surrounding BART's shutdown of cell phone service on August 11,
2011. Part III provides an overview of the applicable First Amendment
protections, including the public forum doctrine and its requisite
elements of content-neutrality and ample alternative means of
communication.
Part IV addresses the constitutionality of BART's shutdown by
applying the public forum doctrine first to the train platform,
concluding that BART acted within its constitutional limits by
reasonably preventing an unsafe protest on the train platform. Part IV
then applies the public forum doctrine to the forum of Internet access,
concluding that BART acted unconstitutionally by restricting
speakers' rights in a designated openpublie forum. This conceptual
exercise encapsulates a counter-intuitiveness that demonstrates the
intractable difficulty in applying the public forum doctrine to modern-
day situations.
Finally, Part V discusses the inconsistency resulting from these
two inquiries and the policy implications of the conflicting forums that
characterize the incident. Part V then discusses how to reframe the
public forum doctrine in light of Internet-based social media's rapidly
growing role in the exercise of free speech in the United States.
II. THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM
The Bay Area Rapid Transit system 36 is a transit district
37
created by California's San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District
Act 38 and is overseen by a publicly elected board of directors. 39
BART, a heavy rail commuter system, endeavors to provide "rapid and
effective transportation between the various portions of the
36 See BAYAREA RAPID TRANSIT, http://www.bart.gov (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
37 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 28745 (West 1973).
38 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 28500 (West 1957).
39 The board of directors consists of nine members, who are determined by the election
districts surrounding the BART system. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 28745 (West 1957).
Because the system was created by statute and managed bythe California state
government, BART is a government actor subject to the First Amendment of the
Constitution.
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metropolitan area surrounding the [San Francisco] Bay.",40 Since its
first day of service on Sept. 11, 1972, it has expanded throughout San
41Francisco and the surrounding urban and suburban areas, seeing over350,000 riders a day.42
A. Wiring the Platforms and Trains for Internet Access
Discussions about wiring the system for Internet and cell phone
access began as early as the summer of 2001, but at first, most riders
opposed the proposal.43 The "widely publicized use" of cell phones to
keep lines of communication open during the September 1 1 th terrorist
attacks, however, turned public opinion around,44 and in 2005, BART
became "the first transit system in the nation to offer wireless
communication to all passengers on its trains underground."45 BART
has a stated goal of providing "loo percent .. seamless [coverage],"
such that "a passenger (on a wireless device) wouldn't know if they
were aboveground or underground."46
BART contracted out to Nextel to install the antennas, and cell
phone carriers were offered the right to buy into a reimbursement
40 The state of California funded extensive studies to determine whether "interurban mass
rapid transit would be a feasible instrument for reducing existing and future interurban
travel problems and for relieving existing and future traffic congestion on freeways, streets
and highways." The result was the establishment of the Bay Area Rapid Transit system.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 28501 (West 1957).
41 A HISTORY OF BART: THE PROJECT IS RESCUED,
http://www.bart.gov/about/history/history3.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
42 American Public Transportation Association, Transit Ridership Report, First Quarter
2011 (May 13, 2011), available at
http://www.apta.com/resources/statisties/Documents/Ridership/20 -qi-ridership-AP
TA.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
43 Michael Cabanatuan, Cell Phones Win Backing Among BART Riders, S.F. CHRON. (Oct.
10, 2001, 4:OO AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Cell-phones-win-backing-
among-BART-riders-Views-2871329.php [hereinafter Cell Phones Win Backing].
44 Id.
45 Michael Cabanatuan, Underground, But Not Unconnected-BART Offers Wireless
Service To Riders, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 19, 2005,
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Underground-but-not-unconnected-BART-offers-
2594271.php.
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contract with Nextel and pay fees to BART.47 By 2008, the service
included AT&T, MetroPCS, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon.48 In a press
release, BART identified how customers were using the service:
Now whether you need to be connected for work or fun while
riding BART, you'll find a continuous mobile signal for you
to text, talk and surf the web on your wireless phone.., all
throughout the Oakland underground as long as you are a
customer of a major wireless phone company. . . . We
understand that every minute counts, and we hope that
by giving you the ability to catch up on work or
socialize while in our stations and onboard our trains,
you'll be able to make the best use of your valuable
time.49
BART did not place any apparent restrictions on its widely promoted
cell phone service and Internet access, a consideration which will
serve as a critical component in this Article's First Amendment
analysis of the incident.50 In particular, BART's continued enthusiasm
about providing such unfettered access seamlessly throughout the
system establishes a contentious backdrop to its decision to selectively
shut off the service in order to prevent an anti-BART protest.
47 Id.
48 Press Release, BART, Underground Cellphone Coverage On BART Expands (July 21,
2oo8), available at http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/20o8/neWs2oo8o721b. In August
2oo, BART continued to expand its cell phone service underground, adding more access
points to trains in downtown Oakland. Press Release, BART, BART Expands Wireless
Network To Underground Stations In Downtown Oakland (Aug. 27, 20o), available at
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2oo/news20oo827 [hereinafter BART Expands
Wireless to Downtown Oakland].
49 BART Expands Wireless to Downtown Oakland, supra note 48. In addition to providing
cell phone service, BART announced both advertisement-supported and fee-based Wi-Fi
service in 2009. Press Release, BART, Wifi Rail Inc. To Provide Wifi Access On BART
System (Feb. 2, 20o9), available at
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2oo9/news2oo9o2o2.
5o See BART Expands Wireless to Downtown Oakland, supra note 48. Public forum
analysis emphasizes the government's intent upon creation of the forum, and the fact that
they initially allowed unrestricted access but subsequently denied it to thwart an anti-
BART protest is crucial in concluding that BART likely violated free speech rights.
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B. Expressive Activities Restricted on BART Property
BART places significant restrictions on expressive activities within
its property.51 Its policy differentiates between the paid areas and free
areas of its stations and trains, completely prohibiting expressive
activity in the paid areas and requiring that speakers apply for permits
to speak in the free areas.52 The paid areas include "BART cars and
trains and BART Station platforms," and the policy explicitly prohibits
"assemblies or demonstrations, [distribution of] written pamphlets or
other materials, [and] gather[ing of] petition signatures or
register[ing] voters" in those areas.53 The permit for free areas may
only be rejected on certain grounds, such as if the activity presents
"unreasonable danger" to BART riders or employees, if it "interfere[s]
with ... the flow of passengers, divert[s] foot traffic or disrupts the
orderly functioning of BART's transportation services."54 This policy
refers only to physical BART property,55 yet served as the primary
justification that BART used to defend the constitutionality of the cell
phone service shutdown.56
51 BART, Rules of the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District Pertaining to Use of
District Facilities for Expressive Activities, available at
http://www.bart.gov/sites/default/files/does/Permit/%22oRues% 2oUpdated/%22oFeb %202
014.pdf (last updated Feb. 2014) [hereinafter Expressive Activities Policy]. Prior to the
2014 version of this policy, BART relied on a October 2005 version of the policy. The new
version adds two sections placing restrictions on activity involving minors (Sections 6 and
7). It also removes from Section 5 the prohibition of "post[ing] or affix[ing]" various
materials "to vehicles on BART property or facilities." These changes are tangential to this
Article.
52 Id.
53 Id. ("The 'Paid Areas' of BART Stations (where access is available only to ticketed
passengers) shall be reserved for ticketed passengers who are boarding, exiting or waiting
for BART cars and trains, or for authorized BART personnel.").
54 Id. ("In furtherance of its function as a provider of public transportation, the District
intends that its property and facilities be used for public transit related activities.").
55 Id. In the aftermath of the 2011 incident, BART relied on the October 2005 version of the
policy. See supra note 51.
56 The anticipated location of the protest was on train platforms, a "Paid Area" on BART
property. The long-standing policy on restricting free speech in those Paid Areas indicates
that the government actor did not intend for train platforms to be a designated public
forum. Thus, because the train platform is a limited or non-public forum, the protesters'
speech would not be constitutionally protected. See discussion of limited forums, infra Part
III.C.3, and discussion of the train platform as a limited forum, infra Part IV.B.
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C. The August 1] Protest and The BART Police's Response
The protest on July 11, 2011, with approximately 50 participants,
had caused severe disruptions to train service and posed significant
safety concerns.57 Protesters "marched around the Civic Center
platform shouting 'no justice, no peace,"' as they "blocked a [train]
doorway for 10 minutes, and shoved BART security guards who tried
to corral them."58 One protester climbed on top of the train car before
he was pulled back down.59 Commuters hoping to bypass the delays
ended up overcrowding the nearby Powell Street Station, which was
also shut down. 60 The entire transit system was delayed for more than
three hours. 61
To mark one month since the previous protest, the organization
No Justice No Bart 62 published a blog post several days prior, asking
people to meet at Civic Center Station on August 11:
As before, we will be meeting in the station, ON the platform.
Please do not have any signs or banners visible as you enter
the station or wait on the platform, as we wish to remain
inconspicuous until the action begins at 5 p.m.... [Activists
should] try to mobilize without public announcement
beforehand. This will allow us the element of surprise, and
BART will not be able to call in their police force to harass
our event. 63
57 BART Protest Snarls Evening Commute, supra note 9. See discussion of impact of
protest, supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
58 Kelly Zito, BARTProtest Causes Major Delays in Service, S.F. CHRON., (July 12, 2011,
8:39 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/BART-protest-causes-major-delays-in-
service-2354913.php. See video of the protest, Manny Ortez, supra note 9.
59 Zito, supra note 58.
60 Id.
61 BART Protest Snarls Evening Commute, supra note 9.
62 This is an unincorporated association that does not appear to have any named
leadership. See No JUSTICE No BART, http://nojusticenobart.blogspot.com (last visited
Mar. 29, 2014); though they appear more active on their Twitter.com account, see TWITFER
NOJUSTICENOBART, http://www.titter.com/nojusticenobart (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
63 Demian Bulwa & Justin Berton, BART On HighAlert, ButNo Protests Yet, S.F. CHRON.
(Aug. 12, 2011, 6:18 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/BART-on-high-alert-
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The post indicated "more instructions would be issued electronically
just before the demonstration was to start."64 BART officials learned of
the blog post and "asked employees for all ideas, 'good or bad,
constitutional or unconstitutional, '"' 65 to thwart it.
On August 11, the morning of the anticipated protest, "[a]t 2:20am
... BART spokesman Linton Johnson fired off an email to the transit
agency's top police officials suggesting that they shut off cell phone
service to foil a protest planned for later that day."66 Three hours later,
BART's deputy police chief agreed to the plan,67 and less than four
hours after that, police officials briefed BART's Board of Directors and
took steps to implement it.68
That afternoon at 4 p.m., BART powered down the antenna nodes
for three hours and notified the cell phone carriers. 69 This did not
but-no-protests-yet-2335600.php (emphasis in original). The original post has since been
taken down but was re-posted by a third party. Andrew Dalton, BART Protest Updates:
Demonstration Planned for Civic Center Station at 4:30 P.M. Today, SFiST.COM (Aug. 11,
2011, 12:25PM), http://sfist.com/2011/o8/1/bart-protest-updates-protestors-des.php.
The group explained the reasoning behind this method of surprise: "Our previous BART
actions have been announced to BART passengers and the media beforehand, and
although BARt [sic] has been totally aware that they are happening, they have done
nothing to warn passengers of the impending disruption, and afterwards, have blamed us
and villified [sic] us in the press for the inconvenience, and threatened to crack down on
our freedom of expression." Id.
64 Paul Elias, BART Protests Go On Without Cell Phone Service Shutdown, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 16, 2011, 9:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/o8/16/bart-
protests -go-on-no-cell-shutdown n 928248.html.
65 Id. See Zusha Elinson, BART Cut Cell Service on Spur of the Moment, Emails Show, BAY
CITIZEN (Oct. 11, 2011, 2:58 PM), http://www.baycitizen.org/bart-protests/story/bart-cut-
cell-service-spur-moment-emails [hereinafter Spur of the Moment] (In Johnson's email,
he wrote, "It's not like it's a constitutional right for BART to provide mobile phone and Wifi
service.").
66 Spur of the Moment, supra note 65.
67 The deputy police chief said, "I like this idea. Can anyone think of a downside?" Id. ("The
decision [to shut off the cell towers] was made on the spur of the moment with little
discussion of the possible consequences.").
68 Zusha Elison, BART: 'We Were Within Our Legal Right' to Shut Down Cell Service, BAY
CITIZEN (Aug. 12, 2011, 6:24 PM), http://www.baycitizen.org/bart-police-
shooting/story/bart-cell-phone-service-legal [hereinafter Legal Right]. See Spur of the
Moment, supra note 65.
69 LegalRight, supra note 68; Press Release, BART, A Letter From BART To Our
Customers (Aug. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news2o110820 [hereinafter Letter from BART].
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affect aboveground cell phone service.70 BART warned passengers of
possible service disruption due to the protest, and increased its police
presence.7 1 Though no one could get cell phone service on the
platforms or in the trains, 120 additional BART personnel were
present with radios, while train intercoms and courtesy telephones72
remained operational during the shutdown.73 By 5 p.m., the time the
protest was scheduled to begin, police officers with riot gear and
members of the media were waiting at the Civic Center Station, but
very few protesters showed up; those who did left very quickly.74 The
transit system encountered no service disruptions and the protest
appeared to have been successfully thwarted.75 A day later, BART
published a statement justifying the shutdown based on
"overcrowding and unsafe conditions" that would be created by a
demonstration on the train platforms.76
Even as the police prepared to turn off cell phone service the
morning of August 11, BART spokesperson Johnson sent out another
email at 3:22 a.m. that proposed a news conference to take place the
same time as the shutdown.77 In the 400-word email, he suggested
70 LegalRight, supra note 68. See also Letter From BART, supra note 69.
71 Zusha Elinson, BART Cuts Cell Service to Foil Protest, BAY CITIZEN (Aug 11, 2011, 11:12
PM), http://www.bayeitizen.org/blogs/pulse-of-the-bay/bart-cut-cell-service-foil-protest.
72 Courtesy telephones are generally found in public transportation hubs and they allow
users reach an operator or station agent. See Press Release, BART Safety & Security: Help
Us Keep BART Safe and Secure, available at http://www.bart.gov/guide/safety (last
visited Mar. 29, 2014).
73 Bulwa & Berton, supra note 63; Press Release, BART, Statement On Temporary Wireless
Service Interruption In Select BART Stations On Aug. 11 (last updated Aug. 12, 2011, 1:08
PM), available at http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news2011o812 [hereinafter
Temporary Wireless Service Interruption].
74 Kravets, supra note 27.
75 Id.; Spur of the Moment, supra note 65.
76 Temporary Wireless Service Interruption, supra note 73 ("BART's primary purpose is to
provide, safe, secure, efficient, reliable, and clean transportation services. BART
accommodates expressive activities that are constitutionally protected by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution ... and has made available certain areas of
its property for expressive activity.").
77 Email from Linton Johnson, BART spokesperson to Gina DeLorenzo, member of BART's
marketing department (Aug. 11, 2011, 3:22 PM), available at
http://www.bayeitizen.org/documents/bart-email.
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that BART gather at least ten to fifteen "loyal riders" to read a
detailed, personalized script denouncing the protests, adding that
each rider should rehearse and be coached so that they "stick[] closely
to this script."78 BART hired a car service79 to take riders to and from
the news conference that took place in Powell Street Station, but only
one rider ended up attending. ° Johnson's deliberate staging of this
pro-BART news conference, in a comparably busier station within the
transit system,81 is a telltale sign that BART's intent in preventing the
anti-BART protest was not purely due to safety concerns.8 2 The night
before the shutdown, Johnson had "called local television news
stations.., to trying to persuade them not to air any coverage" of the
anticipated protest.8 3 If BART's actions were motivated even in part to
suppress the anti-BART sentiment of the protesters, as this news
conference and Johnson's other actions seem to imply, then the
shutdown would likely be unconstitutional.
On August 20, more than a week after the incident, the president
of BART's Board of Directors released a letter that provided more
details about the shutdown. 84 The letter stated that BART's policy for
restricting the exercise of free speech to designated areas of its
stations had been in place for over 25 years.85 The BART police had
received information about plans involving "color-coded teams to
conduct lawless activity on the platforms," orchestrated by the
organization that had sponsored the protest on July 11.86 According to
78 Id.
79 The car service, which was not used, cost $872 for BART. Zusha Elinson, BART's Media
Manipulation Strategy, BAY CJTJZEN (last updated Sept. 13, 2011, 6:40 PM),
http://www.bayeitizen.org/bart-protests/story/inside-barts-protest-propaganda-
campaign [hereinafter Media Manipulation Strategy].
80 Id.
81 BARTAverage Weekday Exits by Station, supra note 11.
82 Spur of the Moment, supra note 65 ("[Johnson] arranged a press conference intended to
sway public perception and media coverage, hired car service to transport 'loyal riders'
there and back, and wrote a script for them to read from." (emphasis added)).
83 Media Manipulation Strategy, supra note 79.
84 Letter From BART, supra note 69.
85 This was presumably referring to the Expressive Activities Policy, supra note 51. Those
designated areas did not include the train platforms. Id.
86 Letter From BART, supra note 69.
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the press release, activists "had been instructed to text the location of
police officers so that the organizers would be aware of officer
locations and response times." 87 The letter reiterated that BART was
concerned the protest could have "far exceed[ed] the protest of July
11," which they believed would have presented "a serious and
imminent threat to the safety of BART passengers and personnel." 88
D. Aftermath
Although BART's action was effective in preventing the protest, it
generated a backlash of criticism arguing that BART had violated the
protesters' constitutionally protected freedom of speech. 89 Even BART
directors publicly acknowledged that missteps had been taken.9O One
director said about the shutdown, "My gut tells me there's something
wrong with it."91 Another director acknowledged the damaging context
of BART's actions:
It's a touchy thing because.., the Arab Spring, makes
it look.., more authoritarian than was the intent....
The intent by our police was definitely to protect our
passengers. It was shown from the previous protest
that it was extremely dangerous, all those people
pushing and shoving.92
871d.
88 Id.
89 Kravets, supra note 27. See Hayley Tsukayama, BART Transit Decides: When Is It Okay
to Shut Down Cell Service?, WASH. POST, Dec. 2,2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/bart-transit-decides-when-is-it-
okay-to-shut-down-cell-service/2011/12/02/gIQAzvsTLO story.html.
90 According to a BART director, although the chief of police briefed the Board prior to the
protests, the decision did not make it through the proper channels because it "wasn't
brought to [them] for discussion [even though they were] the policymakers." Zusha
Elinson, BART Director: Cell Phone Shutdown Didn't Go Through Proper Channels, BAY
CITIZEN (Aug. 13, 2011, 3:03 PM), https://www.baycitizen.org/news/bart-police-
shooting/bart-director-cell-phone-shutdown-didnt [hereinafter Proper Channels].
91 Legal Right, supra note 68.
92 Matt O'Brien, Computer Hackers Expose BART Riders' Personal Information, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011), http://www.mercurynews.com/top-stories/ci-18680763.
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But Johnson, the BART spokesperson who initially suggested the
shutdown, reacted differently to the criticisms. He said that cell phone
service "is an amenity. We survived for years without [it] .... Now
they're bitching and complaining that we turned it off for three
hours?"93
The shutdown prompted not only severe criticism but in fact
generated further calls for protests. 94 Most conspicuously among
them, the hacker group known as Anonymous-which has latched
onto a number of causes including most recently Wikileaksg5 and
Occupy Wall Street96-encouraged people via YouTube97 to show up at
the Civic Center Station the following Monday.98 The resulting protest
caused BART to close four stations.99
93 Proper Channels, supra note 90. While discussing the possibility of a shutdown,
Johnson stated in an email, "It's not like it's a constitutional right for BART to provide
mobile phone and Wifi service." Spur of the Moment, supra note 65.
94 Gaynor, supra note 13 ("One protestor stood silently with a shirt that read, 'Dear BART,
you can't take away our ability to call 911 while also making it a habit to shoot your
riders."'); Jon Brooks & Lisa Pickoff-White, Protestors Shut Down Four BART Stations
Monday, KQED NEwS (Aug. 15, 2011, 6:15 PM),
http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/201/o 8/15/bart-decries-hacker- attack-defends -cell-
phone-shutdown; Anonymous Hacks SFs MyBART Website, Thousands Of Names,
Addresses &Numbers Released, THENEXTWEB.COM (Aug. 14, 2011, 9:19 PM),
http://thenextweb.com/insider/201/o8/14/anonymous-hacks-sfs-mybart- website-
thousands -of-names- addresses-numbers-released [hereinafter Anonymous Hacks];
Proper Channels, supra note 90.
95 See Jennifer Preston, Social Media Gives Wall Street Protests a Global Reach, MEDIA
DECODER (Oct. 15, 2011, 3:10 PM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/20 11/10/15/social-media-gives-wall-street-
protests -a-global-reach.
96 See id.
97 As well as several other online social media outlets including Twitter and Facebook.
TheAnonPress, Anonymous-Operation-BART, YOuTUBE (Aug. 14, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kL8DJ8nay5I (' The Bay Area Rapid Transit has
decided that blocking cellular communication is the correct way to scare off protesters....
We will show the world and BART that we will not stand for these types of actions.").
98 Proper Channels, supra note go. Among other actions, Anonymous hacked the website
myBart.org and released the contact information of 2,400 subscribers. Anonymous
Hacks, supra note 94.
99 Brooks & Pickoff-White, supra note 94.
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E. BART's New Policy For Cell Phone Service Shutdowns
In December 2011, the BART Board of Directors approved a new
policy specific to its cell service that would restrict the circumstances
under which they could shut it off,100 pending approval from the
Federal Communications Commission.O1 The policy required "strong
evidence of imminent unlawful activity" to prompt such an
interruption of the system's cell service.102 Examples of such unlawful
100 Maria L. La Ganga, BART Officials Craft Policy for Cutting Cellphone Service, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, http://articles.latimes.Com/2o1/aug/25/local/la-me-o825-bart-cell
phones-20o0825.
101 On August i6, 2011, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced that it
would be investigating the incident for possible First Amendment and statutory violations.
The commission may impose fines or other punitive action on the transportation agency if
it finds that such violations occurred. Sara Jerome, FCC Probing Wireless Blocking by San
Francisco Authorities, NAT'LJ. (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.Com/2ol1/o8/fee-probing-wireless-blocking.php. As
of April 22, 2014, the most recent update to its investigation dates back to December 2,
2011, when the FCC indicated that it had still not completed its investigation. FCC To
Review BART Cell Service Shutdown Policy, CBS NEWS (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.ebsnews.com/news/fee-to-review-bart-cell-service-shutdown-policy
[hereinafter FCC to Review].
BART's actions may have violated the Communications Act of 1934, which prohibits local
and state law enforcement agencies from jamming transmissions. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
These potential statutory violations, however, are outside the scope of this Article. See
discussion of potential Communications Act violations, Jennifer Spencer, Note, No
Service: Free Speech, The Communications Act, and BARTs Cell Phone Network
Shutdown, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 767,794-803 (2012).
102 The policy states in relevant part:
[I]t shall be the policy of the District that the District may implement a temporary
interruption of operation of the System Cellular Equipment only when it determines that
there is strong evidence of imminent unlawful activity that threatens the safety of District
passengers, employees and other members of the public, the destruction of District
property, or the substantial disruption of public transit services; that the interruption will
substantially reduce the likelihood of such unlawful activity; that such interruption is
essential to protect the safety of District passengers, employees and other members of the
public, to protect District property or to avoid substantial disruption of public transit
services; and that such interruption is narrowly tailored to those areas and time periods
necessary to protect against the unlawful activity.
Extraordinary Circumstances Only, supra note 29. The FCC Chairman said in a statement,
"Today BART took an important step in responding to legitimate concerns raised by its
August 11, 2011 interruption of wireless service. As the policy BART adopted recognizes,
communications networks that are open and available are critical to our democracy and
economy." Additionally, the policy included two sentences suggested by the FCC that
GENG
activity included using cell phones "(i) as instrumentalities in
explosives; (ii) to facilitate violent criminal activity or endanger
District passengers, employees or other members of the public ... and
(iii) to facilitate specific plans or attempts to destroy District property
or substantially disrupt public transit services."103 The Board's
president said that "shutting down cell service is a necessary tool for
BART to have."14
By preempting a protest in this way, BART came under severe
criticism for infringing on the free speech rights of the protesters. 105
The American Civil Liberties Union wrote an open letter to BART
calling the shutdown a "prior restraint,"106 which if true, would bear a
"heavy presumption" of unconstitutionality.0 7 The unique factual
circumstances surrounding this incident, however, bring to light the
significant inadequacies of the First Amendment's public forum
doctrine due to today's increasing reliance on Internet-based social
media to express dissent and organize physical demonstrations.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT' S PROTECTION OF FREE SPEECH
Freedom of speech is a right protected by the First Amendment for
four primary reasons: to "further self-governance, to aid the discovery
acknowledged cutting cell phone service "poses serious risk to public safety" and should
only be done when benefits outweigh the risks. FCC To Review, supra note 101.
103 Extraordinary Circumstances Only, supra note 29.
104 Travis Bickham, BART Board Will Review Policy To Temporarily Interrupt Cell Phone
Service In Stations, DAILY CALIFORNIAN, Oct. 24, 2011,
http://www.dailycal.org/2011/10/24/bart-board-will-review-policy-to-temporarily-
interrupt-cell-phone-service-in-stations; Michael Cabanatuan, BART Cell Phone Shutdown
Rules Adopted, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 2, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/BART-
cell-phone-shutdown-rules-adopted-2344326.php [hereinafter Shutdown Rules Adopted]
(" 'If we were faced with the exact same situation, we would not shut off cell phone service,'
said Bob Franklin, board president. 'We would arrest people."').
1o5 Kravets, supra note 27.
io6 This Article will not discuss prior restraint at length, as the focus is the unique nature of
the August 11 shutdown and its ramifications for the public forum doctrine. See discussion
of prior restraint, infra Part III.F.
107 Letter from Abdi Soltani, Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union of
Northern California, to Kenton W. Rainey, BART Chief of Police (Aug. 15, 2011), available
at http://www.aclune.org/issues/technology/blog/asset upload file33510381.pdf (last
visited Mar. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Letter from Abdi Soltani].
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of truth via the marketplace of ideas, to promote autonomy, and to
foster tolerance."1o8 In the oft-cited concurrence to Whitney v.
California, Justice Brandeis wrote that freedom of speech is
"indispensible to the discovery and spread of political truth,"19 and
that such a freedom "should be a fundamental principle of American
government."11o
A. Commitment to Uninhibited Debate on Public Issues
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law.
abridging the freedom of speech,"1' and signifies that the
government cannot "restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content."112 Such expression was given
protection to "assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people."113 Its
protections are the result of a "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."114 The First Amendment protects speech and conduct, as
long as the conduct contained "[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message, and.., the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."115 The First Amendment
1o8 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 926 (3d ed. 2006).
lo9 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
110 Id.
111 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
112 Police Dept. of City of Chi. v. Mosley, 4o8 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
113 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
114 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
115 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 410-11 (1974)). The Court reviews the "nature of [the] activity, combined with the
factual context and environment in which it was undertaken" to determine whether the
speaker "engaged in a form of protected expression." Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10. See, e.g.,
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Cmty. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-o6 (1969) (where
students wore black armbands to school to publicize their objections to the Vietnam War).
The actions of the protesters, whether it is the act of showing up on the train platform
with signs decrying the BART shooting, or the earlier act of posting Internet-based
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"'embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all
matters of public concern."'116
These protections are, however, not absolute,117 and the Supreme
Court has developed what is known as the "public forum doctrine" to
determine whether speech on publicly-owned property is
constitutionally protected.11 8 The government is no different than any
other private owner of property in the sense that it still maintains the
"power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which
it is lawfully dedicated."119 Thus, the government can prohibit access
to public property if it is not found to be a public forum.12o Under this
doctrine, which took on its modern shape in Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,121 the Court
identified several types of publicly-owned property to standardize how
much the government could limit speech. Since Perry, the doctrine
has developed into roughly four categories, distinguished primarily by
the government's original intent upon their creation: traditional
public forum, designated public forum, limited public forum, and
messages to rally and organize those protesters, would be, in context, considered by the
Court as part of the same act of protected speech. This protection would be upheld because
it is no different than the act of showing up for a rally and the earlier act of handing out
leaflets that advertise for that rally. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 3o8 U.S. 147, 162
(1939) (The Court invalidated an ordinance which barred an appellant from distributing
handbills to pedestrians, announcing a meeting to be held to discuss a war in Spain, and
called the distribution of pamphlets "historical weapons in the defense of liberty.").
ii6 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980)
(quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940)).
117 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171, 177-78 (1983) ("We have regularly rejected the assertion that people who wish 'to
propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however
and wherever they please."').
118 See Grace, 461 U.S. at 177-78.
119 Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). See Grace, 461 U.S. at 177-78 ("Publicly
owned or operated property does not become a 'public forum' simply because members of
the public are permitted to come and go at will."); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)
(reversing the lower court's "mistake" in assuming that "whenever members of the public
are permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by the Government, then that place
becomes a 'public forum' for purposes of the First Amendment.").
120 Grace, 461 U.S. at 178.
12, Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
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non-public forum.122 Depending on which type of forum the state has
created, the court would then review the restrictions on speech
according to differing levels of scrutiny, by weighing "the
government's interest in limiting the use of its property" against the
interests of the speakers.123 Identifying the train platform at the Civic
Center Station as a traditional or alternate type of forum is then
pivotal in determining whether BART's actions on August 11 can pass
constitutional muster.
Expressive activity in public forums are subject to reasonable
"time, place, and manner" restrictions124 as long as those restrictions
are 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information."125 Such restrictions, in other
words, must be content-neutral both on their face and intent. If the
government's purpose is "to suppress speech," even if its actions
facially appear "to be neutral as to content and speaker," its purpose
renders the restrictions unconstitutional.12 6 A more egregious
violation would be viewpoint discrimination, in which the government
suppresses speech of one viewpoint while allowing the other; the First
Amendment completely prohibits the government from regulating
speech based on the ideology of the message.127 Thus, depending on
how the Court categorizes the Civic Center train platform, BART's
actions must maintain content-neutrality both facially and through
their intent in order to be constitutional.
122 Id.
123 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
124 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 304 (1940)).
125 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
126 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2664 (2o11).
127 Chemerinsky, supra note io8, at 934. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). See discussion of content and viewpoint neutrality, infra Part
III.D.
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B. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
The First Amendment provides that the government may "impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of protected
speech. '"12 3 The reasonableness of such restrictions is dictated by "the
nature of [the] place and the 'pattern of its normal activities"' and the
Court would seek to answer whether the manner of the speech is
incompatible with the functioning of the property.129
Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations have included
licensing for parades, "restrictions on the hours of door-to-door
solicitation, or even-handed limits on the location of sidewalk
picketing,"130 whereas unreasonable regulations could include
excessively high licensing fees that are unfairly enforced,131 or a
prohibition on anonymous pamphlet distribution.132 Similarly, BART's
Expressive Activities Policy requires that interested parties apply for a
128 Provided that such restrictions also comply with content neutrality, "are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels for communication," as discussed infra Parts III.D-E. Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 293) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
129 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (quoting Charles Alan Wright, The
Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1042 (1969)) (distinguishing between
a silent vigil in a library and making a speech in the library's reading room, Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966)).
130 William D. Araiza, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, HISTORY & DIALOGUES 1370 (3d. ed.
2006). A Wisconsin ordinance that completely bans picketing "before or about any
residence" is found to be reasonable. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 493-95 (1988). A
complete prohibition of camping overnight in the National Mall and Lafayette Park was
found to be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction even though protesters argued
that it prevented them from "demonstrating the plight of the homeless." Clark v. Commty.
For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1984). In Ward, it was a reasonable
manner restriction for New York City to require that performers in Central Park's
bandshell use the city's sound equipment and technician. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791-92.
131 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 ("It is, of course, undisputed that appropriate,
limited discretion, under properly drawn statutes, or ordinances, concerning the time,
place, duration, or manner of use of the streets for public assemblies may be vested in
administrative officials, provided that such limited discretion is 'exercised with "uniformity
of method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free from improper or
inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination" [and with] a "systematic,
consistent and just order of treatment, with reference to the convenience of public use of
the highways."' " (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,576 (1941)).
132 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (196o).
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license to engage in expressive activity within certain areas of its
property.133
C. The Public Forum Doctrine's Four Forums
The public forum doctrine is currently somewhat ambiguous and
complex to parse, 134 in part due to subsequently inconsistent naming
schemes since it first crystalized in Perry.35 With the advent of the
133 See supra Part II.E.
134 The doctrine has been severely criticized in Supreme Court dissents and by lower courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 741 (199o) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I
have questioned whether public forum analysis, as the Court has employed it in recent
cases, serves to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues at hand.... Indeed, the Court's
contemporary use of public forum doctrine has been roundly criticized by
commentators."); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 820-26 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Rather than taking the nature of the property into account in
balancing the First Amendment interests of the speaker and society's interests in freedom
of speech against the interests served by reserving the property to its normal use, [in using
the public forum doctrine,] the Court simply labels the property and dispenses with the
balancing."); ACLU v. Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1o9910oo (9th Cir. 2003) ("In the absence
of any widespread agreement upon how to determine the nature of a forum, courts
consider a jumble of overlapping factors, frequently deeming a factor dispositive or
ignoring it without reasoned explanation. Consequently, courts do not always agree on the
goals and proper application of forum analysis."). See also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Public
Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REv. 1975, 1976, n.3 (2011); Michael J. Friedman, Dazed and
Confused: Explaining Judicial Determinations of Traditional Public Forum Status, 82
TUL. L. REv. 929,930 (2008) ("For such an old and well-established piece of constitutional
law, it is surprising that great confusion still exists over just what property qualifies as a
public forum."); Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IowA L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2001) (describing public forum analysis as "an edifice
now so riven with incoherence and fine distinctions that it is on the verge of collapse");
Suzanne Stone Montgomery, When the Klan Adopts-A-Highway: The Weaknesses of the
Public Forum Doctrine Exposed, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 557, 558 (1999) ("Four different federal
courts, confronted with three substantially similar programs, approached the public forum
doctrine in five different ways.... [T]he courts reached three different decisions regarding
the type of forum at issue."); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum
Doctrine: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 109, 110 (1986)
("[C]onceptual approaches such as that embodied in the nonpublic-forum doctrine simply
yield an inadequate jurisprudence of labels.").
135 See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMEFEE L.
REv. 647, 654 (2010) ('The most confusion surrounds the phrase 'limited public forum.'
When the Supreme Court first used the term, the context indicated that the Court viewed
the limited public forum as a place subject to the public forum standard. After
approximately 199o, the Court used the phrase 'limited public forum' to describe a place
subject to the nonpublic forum standard."). See also discussion of the four forums and
their relationship to each other, infra Parts III.C.i-5.
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Internet, the challenge of classifying forums into particular categories
has made the legal effects of the First Amendment even more difficult
to ascertain when applied to modern-day situations.136 Nevertheless,
the categorization does serve to organize the discussion and provides a
simple framework that can guide the evolution of the First
Amendment in an era of rapidly changing modes of communication.
In the most recent Supreme Court case concerning the public
forum, Justice Ginsburg named only three forums: traditional,
designated, and limited.137 The fourth forum, a non-public forum, is
not mentioned, but constitutional scholars generally deem it to be the
most restricted type of limited forum as developed in Perry.133 What
further convolutes this doctrine is that in Perry, the Court defined a
limited public forum as "created ... for a limited purpose such as use
by certain groups ...or for the discussion of certain subjects."139
Scholars have attempted to clarify this jurisprudence by calling
limited forums a sub-category of designated forums, thereby
136 See Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1976, n.3.
137 Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez,
130 S.Ct. 2971, 2984 n.ii (2011). In that footnote, Justice Ginsburg wrote that designated
public forums are created when "'government property that has not traditionally been
regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose'; speech restrictions
in such a forum are 'subject to the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional public
forum,"' and that limited public forums are property that is "limited to use by certain
groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects." Id. at 2984 n.11. In that
case, a student religious organization alleged that the law school's policy of requiring
officially recognized student groups to comply with the school's nondiscrimination policy
violated the organization's First Amendment rights to free speech. Id. at 2980-8i. The
Court found that the school's policy was a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral one that did not
violate the First Amendment. Id. at 2995.
138 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 46o U.S. 37, 49 (1983) (finding that
publicly-owned property can be a non-public forum because "[i]mplicit in the concept of
the non-public forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject
matter and speaker identity," which is essentially identical to the Court's subsequent
descriptions of the limited public forum such as in Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533, 543 (2001)); Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33 NOvA
L. REv. 299, 304, 320 (2009) (discussing that in Perry and its subsequent cases, the
"limited public forum was ... being equated, for all intents and purposes, with the non-
public forum.").
139 Perry, 46o U.S. at 46 n.7. See Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1984-85, 1988. For discussion
of the confusion, see Lyrissa Lidsky, Category Confusion and Public Forums: CLS v.
Martinez, PRAWFsBLAwG (Aug. 11, 2010, 2:27 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2oo/o8/category-confusion- and-public-
forums-cls-v-martinez.html.
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simplifying it into two types of public forums: traditional and
designated.14o A designated forum then includes three sub-categories:
(1) "open" public forums, (2) limited forums, and (3) non-public
forums.141 This model, given its division between traditional and
designated forums, appropriately highlights the significant
presumption against finding a public forum that protects the most
speech.142 The critical determinant for what makes publicly-owned
property a certain kind of forum is the government's intent at the
forum's creation.143
1. Traditional Public Forum
The most clearly delineated category of public forum is that of the
traditional public forum, which is limited to three "quintessential"
forms of public property: public streets, sidewalks, and parks.144 By
definitively naming these three-and only these three-types of places,
the Court has shut out the possibility that other forms of property
could potentially fit within it.145 Traditional public forums are "open
for expressive activity regardless of the government's intent."146 This
singular inquiry of whether a given venue is a street, sidewalk, or a
140 Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1984; Friedman, supra note 134, at 934-35.
141 See discussion of how these sub-categories differ, infra Parts III.C.2-4.
142 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985) (The Court refuses to
infer government intent "to create a public forum when the nature of the property is
inconsistent with expressive activity.").
143 See infra Part III.C.5. But see Caplan, supra note 135, at 655-57 (suggesting that the
public forum doctrine is overused because the Supreme Court is "curiously resistant" to
stating that a given location is not a forum, "even when that seems to be the Court's
holding.").
144 Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Orgs., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
145 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) ("No particularized inquiry into the precise
nature of a specific street is necessary; all public streets are held in the public trust and are
properly considered traditional public forums."). But see United States v. Kokinda, 497
U.S. 720, 727 (1990) ('The postal sidewalk at issue does not have the characteristics of
public sidewalks traditionally open to expressive activity.... [T]he postal sidewalk was
constructed solely to provide for the passage of individuals engaged in postal business. The
sidewalk leading to the entry of the post office is not the traditional public forum sidewalk
referred to in Perry.").
146 Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (emphasis added).
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park stands in stark contrast with how the Court defines the other
categories of forums to be discussed below.
The Court justified its formulation of the traditional public forum
by explaining that these are "places by which long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,147 and in
Cornelius v. NAACP, the Court noted that such places are property
that has as "a principal purpose ... the free exchange of ideas."148 In
clarifying what qualifies as "tradition," the Court's Int'l Society for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee opinion in 1992 stated that airport
terminals have not "'immemorially ... time out of mind' been held in
the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity," stating
that the U.S. had only 807 airports in 1930, and thus-by that fact
alone-airports cannot be traditional public forums.49 This analysis
indicates that the Court would require that a venue be used for
expressive activity for more than 6o years before seriously considering
it as a possible traditional public forum.15o Indeed, this high bar
clashes with society's emerging dependency on the Internet as a
medium to engage in expressive activity, and the August 11 shutdown
exposes just how out of touch this formulation of the public forum is
with social norms.
In a traditional public forum, the government may enforce
reasonable "time, place, and manner" regulations that are "content-
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. '"151 If the government "enforce[s] a content-based
exclusion[,] it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end. "152
147 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 46o U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
148 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 8oo (1985).
149 Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 68o-81 (1992)
[hereinafter ISKCON] (quoting Hague, 307 U.S. at 515).
15o See discussion of ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, infra Part IV.B.i.
151 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,481 (1988) (quoting Perry, 46o U.S. at 45).
152 Id. at 481.
2014]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
2. Designated "Open" Public Forum
The government may also voluntarily open up public property for
expressive activity by the public, designating places that do not qualify
as traditional public forums for expressive activity.153 Some scholars
use the term "designated public forum" to label a category that
includes both "open" designated public forums and "limited" public
forums; open forums would be subject to the same high level of
scrutiny as traditional forums, while limited forums would allow the
government to define a limited range of expressive activity.154 This
aspect of the doctrine remains unclear due to a cryptic footnote in the
Court's Perry decision, which observed that the "second category" of
public forum may be created "for a limited purpose."155 Despite this
ambiguity, the Court has acknowledged that there are at least two
types of non-traditional public forums that can be intentionally
opened for expressive activity: designated and limited public forums,
that differ based only on whether the government placed speech
restrictions on the forum at its outset.5 6
Designated "open" public forums must be created "by intentionally
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse,"157 and "absent
[such] clear indication of government intent," the Court will not find a
public forum.153 To determine the government's intent, the Court
reviews the government's "policy and practice,"159 and also considers
the location and other attributes of the property, because the
153 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. See also Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,
469 (2009) ("With the concept of the traditional public forum as a starting point, this
Court has recognized that members of the public have free speech rights on other types of
government property and in certain other government programs that share essential
attributes of a traditional public forum.").
154 Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1981-85.
155 Id. at 1984 (referring to Perry, 46o U.S. at 46 n.7) ("A public forum may be created for a
limited purpose such as use by certain groups," citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981), or for the discussion of certain subjects, see Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wise.
Public Emp't Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)).
156 See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 2984 n.ii (2011).
157 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
158 Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1984.
159 Id. at 1984 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
[Vol. 10:1
GENG
''governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic
nature and function of the particular forum involved."160 Therefore,
"the government does not create an [open] public forum by inaction
or by permitting limited discourse."161 Examples of such a designated
open public forum have included a municipal theatre 62 and a school
board meeting open to the public. 63
When the Court finds a designated "open" public forum, the First
Amendment binds the government to the same standards of strict
scrutiny as it would for a traditional public forum, even if it was not
initially required to create the forum. 64 Although the government is
not required to "indefinitely retain the open character of the facility,
as long as it does" remain open, the government can only place
reasonable "time, place and manner" regulations on speech.165 As is
the case for traditional public forums, content-based restrictions upon
designated public forums "must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a
compelling state interest."166 How BART has initially designated its
property, such as its train platforms or stations, determines whether
speech is constitutionally protected there. Because of its policy on
expressive activity, which prohibits speech on train platforms and
requires licenses to speak in certain other parts of BART stations 67
16o United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990) (quoting Heffron v. Int'l Soc. For
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 65o-651 (1981)); ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992)
(recognizing that "the location of property also has bearing because separation from
acknowledged public areas may serve to indicate that the separated property is a special
enclave, subject to greater restriction.").
161 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
679 (1998) ("A designated open public forum is not created when the government allows
selective access for individual speakers rather than general access for a class of speakers.").
162 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,555 (1975) ('The...
Auditorium [was a] public forum[] designed for and dedicated to expressive activities.").
163 Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisc. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174-
75 (1976) ("[T]he school board meeting at which [the plaintiff] was permitted to speak was
open to the public.").
164 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469-70 (2009); Perry Educ. Assoc.
v. Perry Local Educators' Assoc., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981).
165 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
166 Id.
16 7 See supra Part II.E.
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BART's physical property would likely be deemed a limited forum
instead of an open public forum.
3. Designated Limited Public Forum
A third category of public forum is the limited public forum, which
is created by the government for a "limited purpose such as use by
certain groups, or for the discussion of certain subjects."163 Examples
of this forum include municipal theatres for theatrical productions (as
opposed to other types of speech),169 or a university student activity
fund to support the university's educational goals.17o
The Perry Court held that, due to the fact that such public
property is neither by "tradition or designation a forum for public
communication," limited public forums are governed by different
standards.171 In this forum, the government may engage in some types
of content-based discrimination, both to define the limited range of
expression and to maintain those limits.172 These content parameters
must be "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum" and
must be viewpoint-neutral.173 The government may also exclude
speakers based on their subject matter, as long as it is reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral.174 However, if the government subsequently
"excludes a speaker whose speech.., falls within the [predetermined]
subject matter constraints of the forum, [that] exclusion is subject to
strict scrutiny."175 Thus, the constitutionality of BART's actions
168 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
169 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,546 (1975).
17o Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 819 (1995).
171 In Perry, union members challenged a provision of a collective bargaining agreement
that granted one bargaining representative exclusive access to the schools' teacher mailbox
and interschool mail system, to the exclusion of a rival union. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
172 Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1984-86. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 37; Legal Serv. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,543 (2001).
173 Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, io8 (2001) (quoting Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)); Pleasant Grove City, Utah v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
174 Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1987.
175 Id. at 1989 (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998)
("If the government excludes a speaker who falls within a class to which a designated
public forum is made generally available, its action is subject to strict scrutiny.")).
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depends on the particular conditions it has placed on its property at
the outset.
4. Non-public Forum or Non-forum
Finally, some types of public property can be deemed non-public
or "not a forum at all."176 Such property would be a "space reserved by
the government where no individual free speech is to take place."177
Access to a non-public forum can be restricted, as long as the
restrictions are "reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
view."178 The Court explained that the restriction "need only be
reasonable; and need not be the most reasonable or the only
reasonable limitation. '"179 A determination that public property is non-
public will effectively "result in deference to the discretion of the
government actor,"1o because in that forum, the state is treated no
differently than a private property owner who has the right to
"preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated."131 The constitutional doctrine that is applicable to
a limited versus a non-public forum appears to be vastly the same; for
both, viewpoint neutrality is required, and restrictions need only be
reasonable. 82
176 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678.
177 Randall P. Bezanson, The Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENY. U. L. REv. 8O9, 810
(2010).
178 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (199o) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808)
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18o Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1979.
181 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178 (1983) (citing Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,
47 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182 Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1989-9o.
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5. Government Intent at Creation of Forum
The Court's distinctions between these four categories rely
exclusively on the government's intent during the establishment of the
forum,13 3 thereby creating a presumption against a finding of public
forum status, unless the intent to create one is "demonstrably
clear."13 4 Thus, the public forum doctrine boils down to the reality that
it is "the government [that] retains the choice of whether to designate
its property as a forum for [a] specified class[] of speakers,"115 aside
from the strictly contained traditional public forum.
D. Content and Viewpoint Neutrality
The public forum doctrine also has strict requirements for content
and viewpoint neutrality. For traditional and designated open public
forums, government restrictions on speech are required to be content-
neutral, while limited forums are by definition restricted on the basis
of content.3 6  Regardless of forum, however, viewpoint-based
regulation is entirely prohibited; thus, a municipal theatre-a limited
forum that regulates based on content because it allows only theatrical
performances-cannot distinguish between plays that espouse one
political viewpoint over another.
183 Justice Kennedy most aptly wrote of the public forum doctrine, 'The First Amendment
is a limitation on government, not a grant of power. Its design is to prevent the government
from controlling speech. Yet under the Court's view the authority of the government to
control speech on its property is paramount, for in almost all cases the critical step in the
Court's analysis is a classification of the property that turns on the government's own
definition or decision, unconstrained by an independent duty to respect the speech its
citizens can voice there." ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
184 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985) (The Court refuses to
infer government intent to create a public forum if the "nature of the property is
inconsistent with expressive activity."); Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1998 (quoting
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 26o, 270 (1988)).
185 The Court further encouraged the government, "if faced with an all-or-nothing choice..
. [it should] open its property to some expressive activity," instead of not opening the
property at all. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 68o (1998).
186 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986). See Police Dept. of City of Chi.
v. Mosley, 4o8 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter or its content.... Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some
groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of
what they intend to say.").
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Content-neutral regulations are those that "are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech."137 In other words, as
best stated in Ward, "the principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality.., is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." 188 In
Ward, for example, requiring performers to use New York City's
sound equipment and technicians during performances in Central
Park was found to be a content-neutral regulation because the
principal justification was to control noise levels.139
Such regulations need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny in that it
must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest.9o The narrow tailoring requirement has generally not been
as "narrow" as one might expect:1 91 the "regulation need not be the
least speech-restrictive means of advancing the government's
interests," as long as that interest "would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation. "192 Thus, the regulation need only be effective to
187 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (citing Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
i88 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
189 Id.
190 Id. at 796 (citing Clark v. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))
(internal quotation marks omitted). For intermediate scrutiny, the government need only
point to a significant state interest to justify a content-neutral regulation, while a content-
based regulation would require a valid compelling interest, and is presumptively invalid.
Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
191 Justice Blackmun stated in dissent, 'The Court's past concern for the extent to which a
regulation burdens speech than would a satisfactory alternative is noticeably absent from
[the Ward] decision. The majority requires only that government show that its interest
cannot be served as effectively without the challenged restriction. It will be enough,
therefore, that the challenged regulation advances the government's interest only in the
slightest, for any differential burden on speech that results does not enter the calculus.
Despite its protestations to the contrary, the majority thus has abandoned the requirement
that restrictions on speech be narrowly tailored in ordinary sense of the phrase." Ward, 491
U.S. at 8o6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
192 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (quoting
Ward, 491 U.S. at 799) (emphasis added). See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968) (A content-neutral regulation will be sustained if "it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."). A slightly different
formulation of this rule was stated in Frisby: "A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and
eliminates no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy." Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
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a discernible extent in serving a significant government interest, even
if there are alternative regulations that would impact speech less.
Generally, if a regulation distinguishes on its face between
"favored speech [and] disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or
views" being expressed, then it is content-based.193 If a regulation
"confer[s] benefits or impose[s] burdens without reference to ideas or
views expressed, [then it is] in most instances content-neutral."194 In
evaluating a constitutional challenge of such a restriction, the Court
has considered whether the state has "adopted a regulation because of
disagreement with the message it conveys," making the government's
purpose the "controlling consideration. '"195 If a regulation serves
purposes that are unrelated to the content of the expressive activity,
even if it has an "incidental effect on some speakers or messages but
not others," the Court would deem it content-neutral.9 6 The Court
466 U.S. 789, 8o8-1o (1984)).
193 Turner, 512 U.S. at 643.
194 Id. Though Professor Erwin Chemerinsky points to Renton which makes the test of
whether a law is content-based or content-neutral not on its terms, but rather its
justification; thus, a law that is justified in content-neutral terms is deemed content-
neutral, even if it is content-based on its face. The government can refute a facially content-
based regulation by justifying it with content-neutral desire to avoid negative secondary
effects. Chemerinsky, supra note io8, at 939.
195 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
196 City of Renton, et al., v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986) (finding an
ordinance that prohibits adult movie theatres within 1,ooo-feet of a residential zone is
content-neutral because the state interest in suppressing crime is unrelated to the films
being shown inside adult movie theatres, and because the ordinance was "aimed at ... the
secondary effects" of the theatres and "not with the content of adult films themselves.").
The secondary effects is an acceptable basis for regulation, because "[i]f the city had been
concerned with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to
close them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to location."
Id. at 48 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 81 n.4 (1976)). See also
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-720, 735 (2000) (determining that a statute prohibiting
any person within 1oo feet of a health care facility's entrance to "'knowingly approach'
within eight feet of another [person without their consent] for the purpose of leafleting or
displaying signs" is content-neutral despite its potentially discriminatory effects because
the state's interests in protecting access and privacy are unrelated to the speech being
regulated. Justice Souter's concurrence adds, "The key to determining whether [the
regulation] makes a content-based distinction between varieties of speech lies in
understanding that content-based discriminations are subject to strict scrutiny because
they place the weight of government behind the disparagement or suppression of some
messages, whether or not with the effect of approving or promoting others."); Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) (upholding the application of a general sales tax to cable
television that was not applicable to print media, despite its discriminatory effects, because
it did not suppress ideas and did not target a small group of speakers). The Court has
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nevertheless warned that a "mere assertion of a content-neutral
purpose" would be insufficient to save a regulation that "discriminates
based on content. '"197 Constitutionally permissible "time, place, or
manner" restrictions may not be based upon the content or subject
matter of speech,193 such as a prohibition on picketing that exempted
picketers of labor disputes.199 In narrow circumstances, the Court has
determined that such content-based restrictions passed constitutional
muster where it found that the specific subject of the speech would
disrupt the facility's operations while other subjects would not.20 0
Content-based regulations on speech must withstand strict
scrutiny, and are presumptively invalid.201 The government must show
that the regulation "is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."202 However, even in
certainly contended with the downsides of this secondary effects aspect.
197 Turner, 512 U.S. at 642-43. But see Marcy Strauss, From Witness to Riches: the
Constitutionality of Restricting Witness Speech, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 291, 317 (1996) (arguing
that Renton "permits an end run around the First Amendment: the government can always
point to some neutral, non-speech justification for its actions.").
198 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (198o).
199 Careyv. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (198o); Police Dept. of City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ('The central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes
permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter.... The operative distinction is the
message on a picket sign.").
200 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99 (An ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of a
school, with an exception of "peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute,"
is found to be an unconstitutional extension of reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions, despite the state's interest in preventing disruption to schools); Consol.
Edison, 447 U.S. at 539 (referring to Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) and Lehman v.
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), finding that "partisan political speech would disrupt
the operation of governmental facilities even though other forms of speech posed no such
danger.").
201 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (citing to Sable
Comm'n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
202 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Sable Comm'n, 492 U.S. at 126 (requiring that
the government use the 'least restrictive means to further the articulated interest," and
finding that the "protect[ion] the physical and psychological well-being of minors" is a
valid compelling interest to satisfy strict scrutiny); Playboy Entr't, 529 U.S. at 813 ("If a
less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use
that alternative.").
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situations where the government makes content-based regulations,
those regulations must still be viewpoint-neutral.203
E. Ample Alternative Channels of Communication
The final piece of the public forum doctrine is the constitutional
requirement that the regulation "leave open ample alternative
channels of communication. '"204 In most cases, the Court's inquiry has
been limited to whether or not alternative channels exist at all for the
speaker, and they are seemingly unconcerned whether those channels
are truly "ample," even if the regulation has significantly restricted the
reach of the speaker.2o5 For example, in Renton, where an ordinance
restricted adult theatres from being within 1,000 feet of any
residential zone, the Court rejected the lower court's concern that
there were insufficient alternative channels for speech merely because
the speakers "must fend for themselves in the real estate market. '"20 6
In Cornelius, where the NAACP sought to be on a list of charities
asking for contributions by federal employees, the Court thought
203 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233-34 (2000)
(referring to Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)).
204 Perry Educ. Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators' Assoc., 46o U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
205 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989) (finding that the regulation
"continues to permit expressive activity," and the fact that it "may reduce to some degree
the potential audience for respondent's speech is of no consequence, for there has been no
showing that the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate."); United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 738-39 (1990) (discussing that the regulation "goes no further than
to prohibit personal solicitations on postal property," and still allows political speech of
other forms) (Kennedy, J. concurring). In Hill, Justice Kennedy's dissent argues that the
ordinance does not leave open ample alternative channels for communication, pointing out
that "door-to-door distributions or mass mailing or telephone campaigns are not effective
alternative avenues of communication for petitioners.... The statute strips petitioners of
using speech in the time, place, and manner most vital to the protected expression." Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 78o (2000) (Kennedy, J. dissenting). He added, "In a fleeting
existence we have but little time to find truth through discourse. No better illustration of
the immediacy of speech, of the urgency of persuasion, of the preciousness of time, is
presented than in this case. Here the citizens who claim First Amendment protection seek
it for speech which, if it is to be effective, must take place at the very time and place a
grievous moral wrong, in their view, is about to occur. The Court tears away from the
protesters the guarantees of the First Amendment when they most need it.") Id. at 792.
206 Renton, 475 U.S. at 54 ("In our view, the First Amendment requires only that Renton
refrain from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and operate
an adult theater within the city.").
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direct mail and in-person solicitation were sufficient alternatives to
the list.207 The standard is thus satisfied if the Court finds that the
regulation continues to permit expressive activity through other
"avenues of communication."203
F. Prior Restraint
The First Amendment also prohibits prior restraint, which the
Court has described to be an "administrative [or] judicial order
forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the
time that such communication are to occur."209 Prior restraint bears a
"heavy presumption against its constitutional validity" in court.2 10 In
its "simple, most blatant form, a prior restraint is a law which requires
submission of speech to an official who may grant or deny permission
to utter or publish it based upon its contents. '"211 The Court is most
concerned when speech has been suppressed "before an adequate
determination [has been made] that it is unprotected by the First
Amendment."212 In Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 213 prior
restraint was found when the Court determined that public officials
had "the power to deny use of a [public] forum in advance of actual
expression," and such power was "not bounded by precise and clear
standards. "214
207 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 8o9 (1985).
208 Ward, 491 U.S. at 802.
209 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting Melville Nimmer,
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 4-14 (1984)); Chemerinsky, supra note io8, at 950.
210 Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (stating that "prior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement" on First
Amendment rights).
21l Alexander, 509 U.S. at 566 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REv. 53, 57 (1984) ("[P]rior restraints are especially
disfavored because they authorize abridgment of expression prior to a full and fair
determination of the constitutionally protected nature of the expression by an independent
judicial forum").
213 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975).
214 Id.
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In the case at hand, although BART's actions appear to constitute
prior restraint because they have suppressed speech before the speech
has occurred, BART was not empowered by any legal means to shut
down cell phone service, and any semblance of procedure they did
have for such an action was not closely followed.215 Courts will engage
in prior restraint analysis in situations where an administrative or
judicial order, such as an injunction, has been challenged on First
Amendment grounds. Thus, although BART exercised its technical
capability to suppress speech, prior restraint does not apply because it
lacked the proper legal vehicle to do it. Ultimately, the circumstances
surrounding the August 11 cell service shutdown best lend themselves
to a dissection of the public forum doctrine because BART's actions
did not forbid speech as an injunction would, and the Court has
historically treated similar circumstances as a question of forum type
rather than whether it was a prior restraint.216
215 The decision to shut down cell service did not make it through the proper channels
because it "wasn't brought to [the Board of Directors] for discussion [even though they
were] the policymakers." See Proper Channels, supra note 9o. The tactic "was presented
[to the directors] as a 'fait accompli." Id. It is unclear whether legal counsel was officially
sought prior to the shutdown. BART spokesman "Johnson said that [BART's lawyer
Sherwood] Wakeman had consulted the Supreme Court case Brandenburg v. Ohio, which
lays out circumstances when 'inflammatory speech' can be squelched, before allowing the
wireless shutdown to go forward." Spur of the Moment, supra note 65. When asked about
the incident in a press conference later: "'Well, um, the discussion took place with counsel
in the room,' Wakeman stammered. 'This is an issue which, from my own experience, when
there is an imminent danger or threat of violation of law, there is legal authority, um, to
curtail free speech."' Id.
Wakeman's analysis was insufficient to protect BART from constitutional challenge.
The Brandenburg standard is that "the state [may not] forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The standard for unprotected speech was
not that it had to be "inflammatory speech" as Wakeman had suggested, but rather that it
must incite "imminent lawless action." It is unlikely the protesters' blog post, see supra
note 63, would constitute unprotected speech under this standard, as it did not advocate
for imminent lawless action, merely a gathering on the train platform a few days later, and
was moreover not the target of BART's speech restriction. Since the speech that would have
likely caused "imminent" action was preemptively suppressed by the shutdown, there is no
speech to analyze to determine whether it would have constituted "incite[ment of] ...
imminent lawless action" under Brandenburg. See W. Danny Green, Comment, The First
Amendment and Cell Phones: Governmental Control Over Cell Phone Use on Publicly
Owned Lands, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1355, 1382 (2012); Brandon Wiebe, Comment, BART's
Unconstitutional Speech Restriction: Adapting Free Speech Principles to Absolute
Wireless Censorship, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 195, 210-212 (2012).
216 See discussion of ISKCON, 5o5 U.S. 672 (1992) (holding that a prohibition against
leafleting in an airport was constitutional because the airport was not a traditional public
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IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BART
CELL PHONE SERVICE SHUTDOWN
The public forum doctrine, despite coming under severe criticism
from both scholars and lower courts in the last few decades, has
continued to be used by the Court to analyze challenges to government
restrictions on speech. The BART cell service shutdown on August 11
not only serves as an additional example of the doctrine's increasingly
stark problems in applicability but moreover highlights a new
quandary that has developed as a result of the interconnectivity in
communication through the Internet. This Article argues that the cell
service shutdown has pinpointed the core of the problem with the
public forum doctrine: the very lines drawn between categories of
forums are obstacles to effective First Amendment analysis because
society now engages in free speech in "places" that cannot be clearly
isolated or distinguished.217 On August 11, 2011, what "place" would
the anticipated speech have occurred, had it not been thwarted: on the
physical train platform, or through Internet access, or both?213 As set
forth below, the court would struggle219 to fit the cell service shutdown
into the public forum doctrine starting with the very first step:
identifying the appropriate forum.
forum), infra Part IV.B.i.
217 Even the definition of what constitutes a forum can be problematic. One scholar wrote
that the "unspoken definition of a forum seems to be 'a platform for expression by persons
other than the owner of the platform.' However ... it becomes clear that many places-
most places, in fact-are not forums. The mere fact that someone might conceivably use a
location for expression does not make it a forum in this sense." Caplan, supra note 135, at
655. He offers the example of "carv[ing his] initials into the walls of the Grand Canyon" or
"picket[ing] in the hallways of the Pentagon"; merely because expressive activity is
occurring does not make the place a viable forum. Id. at 655.
218 See discussion of what constitutes the "forum," Wiebe, supra note 215, at 211-12.
219 Courts would likely struggle, just as constitutional scholars have. One scholar was "not
sure if [BART has violated] the First Amendment. Marvin Ammori, Silencing Phones,
Stifling Protests, Violating Freedom of Speech?, AMMORI.ORG (Aug. 12, 2011),
http://ammori.org/2o11/o8/12/bart-sf-silencing-mobile-phones-stifling-political-
protests -violating-first-amendment. Another scholar thought BART's actions were 'likely
constitutional." Eugene Volokh, An Unusual (But Likely Constitutional) Speech
Restriction, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 13, 2011, 11:22 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2o11/o8/13/an-unusual-but -likely-constitutional-speech-
restriction. Scholar Ammori commented on the disagreement: "Both of us are less than
certain (using terms like 'likely'), partly because First Amendment jurisprudence has so
much ambiguity in it." Marvin Ammori, BART SF 4: More on First Amendment Analysis,
AMMORI.ORG (Aug. 13, 2011), http://ammori.org/2o11/o8/13/bart-sf-4-more-first-
amendment.
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A. Identifying the Forum
The August 11 incident, along with other recent world events,
signals the growing trend of using the Internet to augment traditional
forms of speech and protest. In particular, social media's ability to
conveniently and effectively network the world's population means
that individuals are gaining "more opportunities to engage in public
speech" to the point where such online tools have become the norm
for those who want to "undertake collective action."220 Although the
utilization of emerging technologies to organize speakers is not a new
phenomenon,221 the true impact of those technologies on the
effectiveness and reach of their speech has never been more apparent
or significant.222 Instead of what used to primarily be a two-way
conversation between protesters and the entity against which they
were protesting, present-day protests have been transformed by social
media in several significant respects. Though news coverage of such
protesters by traditional media did spur conversation among pockets
of non-participants, today social media has opened a common
conversation that is accessible by all.223 This lessens the traditional
media's overall influence on speech and removes an intermediary that
by its nature had to filter the content of the medium it provided.
Because it is not constrained by limited resources as traditional
media was, Internet-based social media is able to serve two purposes
220 Clay Shirky, The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and
Political Change, 9o FOREIGNAFF. 28 (Feb. 2011). See generally Stacey D. Schesser,
Comment, A New Domain for Public Speech: Opening Public Spaces Online, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1791 (2006).
221 Shirky, supra note 220 (commenting that a text message as simple as "Go 2 edsa. Wear
blk" brought millions of Filipinos to converge on a major intersection in Manila to protest
against a corrupt politician in 2001. This analysis remains highly relevant even though this
piece was written prior to the Arab Spring).
222 Amy Gahran, Mobile Toolsfor Protest-Then and Now, CNN.COM (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://edition.enn.Com/2011/io/io/tech/mobile/mobile-tools-for-protest (comparing the
difference between 2004, where text messaging was the primary mobile tool for protest
coordination, and 2011 for the Occupy Wall Street protests, which were organized on
Twitter and Facebook, and finding that even "apolitical" individuals would know about
Occupy Wall Street because it had become a "social phenomenon."). See also Ezra Klein,
The Revolution Will Be Tweeted, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (May 2, 2011, 11:39 A.M.),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/the-revolution-will-be-
tweeted/2011/04/13/AFIoOIZF blog.html.
223 Gahran, supra note 222.
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efficiently: it is both a tool to organize speech,224 as well as a platform
for speech itself,225 akin to being able to leaflet everyone at once. In
other words, the once easily separable acts of "creating" speech22 6 and
"receiving" speech227 have become combined into one amorphous
action thanks to the Internet. Its capacity to significantly expand the
scope of protests makes it an easy target for government regulation
intended to restrict the resulting speech conducted in traditional
physical locations, and thus, its dual-purpose nature as both a tool
and a platform has profound implications for protesters' First
Amendment rights.
BART's shutdown of cell phone service therefore poses the
essential constitutional questions that courts will surely face in the
future when weighing the protections afforded to speakers against the
government's interests in regulating them. The current First
Amendment framework of the public forum doctrine evolved from,
and still retains attributes of, the most basic concept that a public
sidewalk is a physical forum where speakers' rights are at their height.
With the emergence of telephone, radio, and other metaphysical
forums for speech, the doctrine has gradually expanded beyond its
core emphasis on physical boundaries,223 but such forums still possess
a common characteristic of limited capacity and this characteristic
continues to play a prominent role in Supreme Court decisions. The
Internet, while not infinite, can afford to accommodate near-limitless
speech with comparably far fewer costs than that of any public forums
224 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 85o-51 (1997) ("Taken together, these tools [referring
to the Internet's e-mail, automatic mailing list services, newsgroups, chatrooms and World
Wide Web] constitute a unique medium.., located in no particular geographic location
but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.... There are
thousands of such [news] groups, each serving to foster an exchange of information or
opinion on a particular topic... ").
225 Id. at 853 ("[The Web] constitutes a vast platform from which to address and hear from
a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers.").
226 E.g., handing out leaflets, protesting at a rally, writing an op-ed piece, burning a flag.
227 E.g., accepting the leaflets, watching the rally, reading the op-ed piece, observing the
flag burning. The First Amendment protects a right to access information as well. See
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("It is now well established that the
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ('The right of freedom of speech and press includes
not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, [and]
the right to read.").
228 See Barbas, supra note 30, at 81o.
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in existence today.229 This is the critical difference, as the BART
shutdown demonstrates, between public forums of yesterday and the
Internet, making the public forum doctrine increasingly more difficult
to apply to reality and possibly obsolete.23o
The BART cell service shutdown stifled both the speech that was to
occur through Internet access as well as on the train platform. To
define the forum, the Court has generally "focused on the access
sought by the speaker. '"231 Here, by way of the Internet, the protesters
sought access to the train platform but were denied both the Internet
access and access to the platform. The planning, as well as some actual
speech, had taken place over the Internet and was stifled. The physical
protest was coordinated to take place on the train platforms. This
exercise in conceptual gymnastics to apply the public forum doctrine
demonstrates the doctrine's failings. Thus, in order to shoehorn the
BART incident into the public forum doctrine, the court must counter-
intuitively separate what has been conventionally considered one unit
of speech: the planning of the protest (over the Internet) and the
actual physical protest (on the train platform).232
229 But, the Internet is generally not a "public forum" because they are overwhelmingly
privately owned, and the private owners have Terms of Service agreements restricting free
speech that would otherwise be constitutionally protected in a public forum. See discussion
of private regulation of speech, Nunziato, supra note 32, at 1116.
230 See John J. Brogan, Speak & Space: How the Internet is Going to Kill the First
Amendment as We Know It, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 74 (2003) ("Conventional wisdom
suggests that the best way to protect the Internet as a forum for free speech is to find ways
to make it like the fora that receive special protection in the physical world.... This
strategy, as applied to the Internet, however, would be exactly backward, and would
produce negative consequences.").
231 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 8o1(1985). One scholar did a study
of 26 appellate court decisions to identify the factors that courts have considered when
deciding if a public space is a traditional public forum. Friedman, supra note 134, at 930,
944. He looked at seven factors: (i) whether the forum was perceived as a street, park, or
sidewalk, (2) whether it has broad public access, (3) whether it is a public thoroughfare, (4)
indistinguishable from the surrounding public area, (5) its general purpose versus
particular purpose, (6) historic use for public discourse, and (7) proximity to a seat of
legislative or executive power. Id. at 946-57.
232 BART's subsequent approval of a separate Cell Service Interruption Policy supports this
Article's method of separating the two forums of the train platform from Internet access.
Recent analysis has concluded that the forum in question ought to be Internet access, not
the train platforms. See, e.g., Jacob G. Fleming, Note, The Case for a Modern Public
Forum: How the Bay Area Rapid Transit System's Wireless Shutdown Strangled Free
Speech Rights, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 631, 653 (2012).
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B. The Train Platform as a Forum for Speech
The first step of conventional public forum analysis focuses on the
location of the protest. Once the location's boundaries have been
identified, the Court then determines the government's purpose for
providing the location, and labels it one of the four types of forums for
speech. The final step of the Court's constitutional analysis is to
determine whether the government has satisfied the forum's
requirements.
1. The Platform is Not a Public Forum
The organizers specifically requested protesters to assemble on the
train platform in Civic Center Station, and BART police assumed the
protest would also occur on the train platform, as it did during
previous protests. Because of BART's clear policy on expressive
activity within its physical property,233 the Court would likely find that
train platforms are non-public forums, or alternately, limited forums
for speech. Thus, such restrictions on speech would only need to be
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral to pass constitutional muster.
The Court's analysis in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee234 (ISKCON) is especially illustrative in
assessing BART's cell phone service shutdown. In ISKCON, a non-
profit religious organization challenged the government's regulation
forbidding the "repetitive solicitation of money or distribution of
literature" within airport terminals.235 The regulation governed only
the terminals and permitted such solicitation and distribution on the
sidewalks outside the terminal buildings.23 6
Although the Court acknowledged that the solicitation at issue was
"uncontested" as protected speech,237 it swiftly concluded that airport
terminals were not traditional public forums, because airports have
233 Expressive Activities Policy, supra note 51.
234 ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
235 Id. at 675.
236 Id. at 675-76.
237 The Court came to a 6 to 3 decision, and Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy filed
concurring opinions that elaborated on the application of the public forum doctrine. Id. at
673.
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"only recently achieved their contemporary size and character," and
they have not "historically been made available for speech activity. '"23 8
ISKCON had pointed to the variety of speech activity occurring at
"transportation nodes," but the Court declined to extend its
conclusion to find that all transportation nodes could not be
traditional public forums.239 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, stated that the airports' primary purpose as one dedicated to
"efficient air travel," not to "the free exchange of ideas," and did not
find the government intended to create a designated or limited public
forum within the airport terminals.24o Concluding that the airport
terminal was a non-public forum, the Court held the regulation to be
reasonable and therefore constitutional because allowing such
solicitation would significantly obstruct airport activities and because
the petitioners were still permitted to solicit outside on the airport
sidewalk.241
Even though the Court did not extend its analysis to all
transportation hubs such as train stations, ISKCON nevertheless
supports the conclusion that the BART train platform is not a public
forum. ISKCON reaffirmed the high threshold required to categorize a
government-owned facility as a traditional public forum and, even
though train stations have been in existence for longer than airports,
implied that the Court would not likely find that train stations are
238 Although the distribution of literature at airports has recently become more
commonplace, the Court nevertheless found that the "tradition of airport activity" has not
been for expressive activity and thus foreclosed on the possibility that airports are
traditional public forums. Id. at 680-8i.
239 Id. at 681-82. For a discussion of the First Amendment concerns of transit facilities not
including those stemming from providing Internet access, see TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH
BOARD OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSIT
FACILITIES: SPEECH, ADVERTISING, AND LOITERING (June 2009), available at
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/terp/terp lrd_29.pdf.
240 ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 681-83.
241 Id. at 683-85. Justice O'Connor's concurrence stated that the regulation banning
leafleting is not reasonable because leafleting poses fewer difficulties for the airport to
accomplish its purpose than face-to-face solicitation does. She found that the airport's
absolute prohibition lacked an independent justification aside from the concerns raised by
leafleting, and emphasized that the Court requires "some explanation as to why certain
speech is inconsistent with the intended use of the forum." Id. at 690-92 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 734 (199o)). BART's
independent justification includes safety and overcrowding concerns, insofar as it has
proven to prevent the transit system from operating.
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"'immemorially ... time out of mind' held in the public trust, and used
for purposes of expressive activity."242
Prior to ISKCON, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
ruled on Young v. New York City Transit Authority, a case that
challenged a transit authority regulation that prohibited begging and
panhandling in the subway system on First Amendment grounds.243
The court found that begging and panhandling was not a type of
protected speech, but then went further and applied the public forum
doctrine,244 concluding that the platforms were not a traditional public
forum.245 The court reasoned that, although the regulation permitted
solicitation by approved organizations, the subway platform was at
best a limited forum "for use by certain speakers," as intentionally
created by the transit authority.4 6 The regulation was constitutionally
sound because the transit authority "never intended to designate
sections of the subway system . . . as a place for begging and
panhandling. '"247 Several facts of the Young case closely parallel those
of BART, in particular its pre-established restrictions on expressive
activity within the stations and on the platforms. BART, in its pre-
existing policy and in its post-incident press releases, reiterated that
"assemblies or demonstrations or . . . other expressive activities"243
were not permitted in the paid areas of BART stations, which included
the platforms and train cars. As the court found in Young, such
restrictions on speech within the station would lead a court to
conclude that BART intended to create a limited or non-public forum,
242 Id. 505 U.S. at 679.
243 Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 199o).
244 The Second Circuit cites both Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985), and Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n, 46o U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983),
in its formulation of the public forum doctrine. Young, 903 F.2d at 161-62.
245 An organization representing homeless people brought a class action challenging a
transit authority regulation that prohibits begging and panhandling in the New York City
subway system. The regulation allowed for certain non-commercial activities in specific
such as "public speaking; distribution of written materials; solicitation for charitable,
religious or political causes; and artistic performances, including the acceptance of
donations," but not on the subway platform, and certain other areas that would interfere
with movement within the station. Id. at 148 (internal quotation marks omitted).
246 Id. at 161 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
247Id. at 162.
248 Temporary Wireless Service Interruption, supra note 73.
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which forecloses protests from occurring directly on the train
platform. Furthermore, in Cornelius, Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, stated that, "[i]n cases where the principal function of the
property would be disrupted by expressive activity, the Court is
particularly reluctant to hold that the government intended to
designate a public forum."249 The BART platform is a limited or non-
public forum because it is designed to allow riders on and off trains as
efficiently and safely as possible, and expressive activity would likely
disrupt that function, as it clearly did during the July 11 protests.
Therefore, any speech restrictions need only be reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral to be constitutional because the train platform is a
limited public forum.
2. Restrictions on Speech Are Reasonable and Viewpoint-Neutral
The Court would likely find it reasonable for BART to prohibit
expressive activity on the train platform for the same reasons it found
that airport terminals were not constitutionally obligated to allow
expressive activity. The Civic Center Station is one of the system's
busiest; it serves four of the system's five train lines,25o and sees the
fourth-highest number of daily riders out of 44 stations, with over
18,ooo exits per day.251 BART's restrictions on speech occurring on
the platform were reasonable, in light of the severe impact on
transportation and the safety concerns of the July 11 protest in which
protesters climbed on top of trains and delayed the entire system for
three hours.252 BART's Expressive Activities Policy253 also permits
demonstrations to occur in other areas of the station, which favors a
finding of reasonableness.
249 Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 788, 804 (1985);
Chemerinsky, supra note io8, at 1143 ("[T]he Court considers the extent to which speech is
incompatible with the usual functioning of the place. The greater the incompatibility, the
more likely that the Court will find the place to be a nonpublic forum.").
250 BART STATION LIST, http://www.bart.gov/stations; CivIC CENTER/UN PLAZA STATION,
http://www.bart.gov/stations/eive/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2014) (The station is
near several notable San Francisco destinations including City Hall, War Memorial Opera
House, Asian Art Museum, Louise M. Davies Symphony Hall, and the Main Branch of the
San Francisco Public Library. The station also connects to the San Francisco Muni trolley
and bus lines.).
251 BART FISCAL YEAR WEEKDAYAVERAGE EXITS, supra note 11.
252 See BARTProtest Snarls Evening Commute, supra note 9.
253 Expressive Activities Policy, supra note 51.
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BART's Expressive Activities Policy is facially viewpoint-neutral
and by that measure, constitutional, although its August 11
enforcement of the policy may have stemmed from viewpoint-based
intent, as perhaps best evinced by Johnson's staged pro-BART news
conference in Powell Street Station.254 Powell Street Station sees
24,000 daily exits and is one of the system's most trafficked, 255 which
perhaps provided Johnson a larger audience than the protest would
have had at Civic Center Station. However, the news conference
occurred within the "free area" of the station, 256 where expressive
activity is allowed with a license, as opposed to the train platform,
where expressive activity is wholly prohibited. Four days after the
August 11 incident, protesters gathered near the Civic Center Station
and marched down Market Street toward Powell Station, just as San
Francisco and BART police officers shut down both the Civic Center
and Powell Stations, as well as several other stations that ran along
Market Street, citing safety concerns. 257 Prior to 2011, BART regularly
shut down various stations to address safety concerns arising from
demonstrations unrelated to BART.258 In this sense, by not physically
shutting down the stations, BART did not react as strongly on August
11 as it did for other protests. Thus, in the context of its actions over
the last several years, BART did not engage in viewpoint-based
enforcement of its policy on expressive activity.
The train platform then, given the Expressive Activities Policy, was
a limited forum that would enable BART to shut off cell phone service
without violating the First Amendment. This conventional approach,
however, neglects the "access sought by the speaker, '"259 which for the
254 Justin Berton, BART Spokesman In Hot Water For Staging Support, S.F. CHRON.
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/BART-spokesman-in-hot-water-
for-staging-support-2309676.php.
255 BARTAverage Weekday Exits by Station, supra note 11.
256 Berton, supra note 254.
257 Damon Poeter, Anonymous BARTProtest Shuts Down Several Underground Stations,
PCMAG.coM (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/o,2817,239116o,oo.asp.
258 BARTStations Open After Protest Closures, ABC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2008),
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/east-bay&id=6482735; Rachel
Gordon, BART Criticized for Closing Three Stations, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 7, 2008),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/BART-criticized-for-closing-3-stations-
3186531.php (The protests were over immigration raids).
259 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 8o (1985).
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August 11 protesters was Internet access while underground in BART
stations and platforms. A court, applying the public forum doctrine to
the Internet access provided by BART, would likely conclude that
BART acted unconstitutionally that day.
C. The Internet
260
The Court's conventional analysis of the train platform as
described above would, by most scholars' expectations, be the end of
the story. By closing the book here, however, the Court would be
denying the fact that today, the Internet has become the latest
realization of the "marketplace of ideas" so critical to the democracy
envisioned by the Founding Fathers. Moreover, the Court's
jurisprudence on the First Amendment provides for analysis of forums
that do not have the physical boundaries easily marked by sidewalks
or doors or walls. The analysis of the Internet below builds upon this
acknowledgement and proceeds to categorize the Internet into one of
the four types of forums. While the Court is unlikely to label the
Internet a "traditional" forum for speech, First Amendment
precedence allows for the "designated open forum" label, which
prohibits the government from placing restrictions on speech after
creation of the forum.
1. The Emergence of the Metaphysical Forum
The Court has had no trouble identifying metaphysical forums as
potential public forums for First Amendment purposes, such as a
charitable fundraising list,261 or a student activities fund,262 or an
interschool mail system.263 In Rosenberger v. Rector, a student-run
26o Cell phone service is an effective equivalent to Internet access for the purposes of this
Article, as the service provided by BART allowed for phone calls, text messages, as well as
full web access. The protesters generally communicated through both web access (via social
media tools such as Twitter) and text messages. The BART Wi-Fi service was also shut
down, but because it included a Terms of Service, it is unlikely amenable to First
Amendment analysis. See Eve Batey, BART Defends Decision to Cut Off Cell Service After
Civil Rights, FCC Concerns Raised, SFAPPEAL.COM (Aug. 12, 2011),
http://sfappeal.com/news/2011/o8/bart-cell-fcc.php.
261 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-05.
262 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 230 (2000);
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
263 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 46o U.S. 37, 37 (1983). See Lidsky,
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religious publication challenged their school's decision not to pay for
the organization's printing costs through a "Student Activities Fund"
because it was prohibited by the school's intentions to support a broad
range of activities related to an educational purpose. 264 Though the
forum was "more ... metaphysical than ... spatial or geographic," the
Court nevertheless applied the public forum doctrine as it would have
to a geographic "place."265 The Court has also described the Internet as
including "vast democratic forums, '"2 6 6 and compared the use of
"internet distribution mechanisms to pamphleteering," while
explicitly referring to public forum case law.267
The generation of Americans that has grown up in the age of
Facebook and Twitter would balk at the mere suggestion that the
Internet is not a public forum in which their speech is protected by the
First Amendment.268 The ACLU, in its letter to BART, compared the
shutdown to the government opening a park and then closing the park
doors to speakers it disagrees with.269 As exemplified by the reasoning
in ISKCON, however, the Court would most likely find that the
Internet cannot qualify as a traditional public forum, wholly because
supra note 134, at 1995.
264 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
265 Id.
266 Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1995 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997)).
The Court has further presumed that restriction of the Internet would negatively impact
freedom of speech. Reno, 521 U.S. at 885 ("The record demonstrates that the growth of the
Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of constitutional tradition,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the
content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to
encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.").
267 Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1995 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-70). Professor Lidsky
stated, "It is hardly a stretch to characterize an interactive social media site as a public
forum, when it is designed explicitly for providing a locus of discussion and debate." Id.
268 See Opening Public Spaces Online, supra note 220, at 1798-99; Cynthia Wong,
Welcome to San Francisco -Next Stop, Cairo?, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY
(Aug. 23, 2011), http://cdt.org/blogs/eynthia-wong/238welcome-san-francisco-next-stop-
cairo.
269 Letter from Abdi Soltani, supra note 107. See also Opening Public Spaces Online, supra
note 220, at 1799 ("In many ways, cyberspace has become the modern embodiment of our
public streets and parks in providing the space for speech.... [A]ctivists seek out their
base audience [by] organizing online campaigns.").
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of how recently it had come into existence.27o Moreover, it was not
until the late 199os that the Internet had developed enough
technological capacity and participation to allow for the near-limitless
speech that now deserves the Court's closer scrutiny for First
Amendment protection.271
2. Designated for Expressive Activity
In United States v. American Library Association (ALA),272 the
Court stated flatly, "Internet access in public libraries is neither a
'traditional' nor a 'designated' public forum."273 Though the public
forum doctrine undeniably forecloses on the possibility that the
Internet can be a traditional forum, the question of whether it can be
a designated one is more nuanced.
Generally, private corporations have provided Internet service,
with no implication of state action.274 However, this is set to change,
as a growing number of U.S. municipalities are installing wireless,
broadband, and cell phone access points.275 The most significant
270 The Internet was invented in the 196os, developed originally as a military-funded
experiment. Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, et al., Brief History of the Internet,
INTERNETSOCIETY.ORG, http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/internet-51/history-
internet/brief-history-internet (last visited Mar. 29, 2014). See Opening Public Spaces
Online, supra note 220, at 1809 ("[E]ven if new forums bear the same qualifies as
'traditional' public spaces, the Court has refused to extend this high level of protection past
the historic confines of the doctrine.... Even though the Internet fits into this 'traditional'
definition and provides an effective space for those who could not otherwise be heard, the
Court's strict interpretation indicates that it will most likely not extend traditional public
forum status to such a new medium for communication.").
271 Leiner, Cerf, et al., supra note 270.
272 United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) [hereinafter ALA].
273 Id. at 205.
274 In ISKCON, the Court stated that until recently, transportation hubs were typically
privately owned, and therefore any evidence of expressive activity occurring in
transportation hubs would be "irrelevant topublic forums analysis." ISKCON, 505 U.S.
672, 681 (1992) (emphasis in original). See discussion of private actors regulating speech,
Nunziato, supra note 32, at 1135-43; Opening Public Spaces Online, supra note 22o, at
1799. While much of the scholarship surrounding Internet speech has been about
developing First Amendment protections in a medium that is mostly privately owned, in
the case of BART, we have a government actor that has willingly provided a forum for
speech through Internet access.
275 See discussion on U.S. municipalities providing Internet access, supra text
accompanying notes 33-35. See also Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The
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development, however, is that communication through the Internet
has "reinvigorated the fundamental essence of the First Amendment,
namely the freedom to express one's political beliefs."27 6 It is in this
context that the BART cell service shutdown exemplifies the
irreconcilable problems of the public forum doctrine.
In ALA, the Court said, "to create [a designated public forum], the
government must make an affirmative choice to open up its property
for use as a public forum. '"277 BART's 2010 press release extolling the
uses of the wireless access appears to indicate that its intent in
providing the service was to allow for unlimited expressive activity,
whether it be for "work or fun" by "text, talk and... web."27 The only
restriction on the service referred to being courteous to fellow
passengers, and maintaining reasonable volume.279
In holding that Internet access in public libraries is not a
designated public forum, the Court considered the purpose that a
public library serves, and the role that Internet access plays within
that purpose.28o A public library's purpose was to "facilitate research,
First Amendment and Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2007). For a
discussion about municipal wireless broadband in the U.S. and developing appropriate
public-private partnership arrangements for communications services, see Sharon E.
Gillett, Municipal Wireless Broadband: Hype or Harbinger?, 79 S. CALIF. L. REV. 561
(2006).
276 Opening Public Spaces Online, supra note 220, at 1796; Zick, supra note 275, at 5
("While we are considering First Amendment concerns, we ought also to ask how
networked public places will affect core speech values, like self-government and civic
interaction, in the traditional public marketplace of ideas. What will all of this networking
do to public places?" (emphasis in original)); Opening Public Spaces Online, supra note
220, at 1798.
27 ALA, 539 U.S. at 206.
278 BART Expands Wireless to Downtown Oakland, supra note 48. However, as one scholar
points out, in ALA, even though the libraries themselves contended that they had "provided
Internet access to their patrons to facilitate communication and exchange on a 'virtually
unlimited number of topics,"' the Court nevertheless declined to call Internet access a
traditional or designated public forum. Nunziato, supra note 32, at 1157 (quoting ALA, 539
U.S. at 202). Professor Dawn Nunziato adds, "In this rare instance of public ownership and
control over Internet speech forums, in which the public entity acknowledges that it
created the forum to facilitate the exchange of ideas and communication among members
of the public on a virtually unlimited number of topics ... If no public forum for expression
is found in these circumstances, it is unlikely that a public forum will ever be recognized in
the context of the Internet." Id. at 1157-58.
279 BART Expands Wireless to Downtown Oakland, supra note 48.
280 ALA, 539 U.S. at 205-07. Moreover, the Court looked at Internet access in public
libraries in the context of whether the Child Internet Protection Act violated the free
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learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of requisite
and appropriate quality," and adding Internet access merely furthered
that purpose, as opposed to creating a "public forum for publishers to
express themselves. '"23 1 Thus, neither a public library's collection nor
the Web itself could be a "forum" for expressive purposes.282 Here,
although BART's core purpose is to provide transportation services, in
fact its decision-making process indicates that it intended to empower
its riders with the ability to communicate in places that would
ordinarily not have cell phone service.23 3 This explicit enablement,
coupled with the society-wide attitude that the Internet is a place for
expressive activity,23 4 is likely sufficient to overcome the presumption
against the finding of a public forum. 285 BART provided cell phone
service in part because it had been heavily relied on for
speech clause because Congress had conditioned their funding based on installing filters
for pornography. Id. at 209. See Chemerinsky, supra note io8, at 1144 ("[T]he Court
considers whether the primary purpose of the place is for speech.").
281 ALA, 539 U.S. at 2o6 ("A public library does not acquire Internet terminals in order to
create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves, any more than it collects
books in order to provide a public forum for the authors of books to speak. It provides
Internet access, not to 'encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,' but for the
same reasons it offers other library resources.").
282 Id.; Zick, supra note 275, at 24.
28 3 See Cell Phones Win Backing, supra note 43.
284 Another significant difference between the ALA decision, which took place in 2003, and
today, is the emergence of Internet-based social media, which arguably has become the
dominant method of social communication. Facebook began in 2003 but was not open to
public registration until 2oo6. Michael Arrington, Facebook Just Launched Open
Registrations, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 26, 2oo8),
http://techerunch.Com/2oo6/o9/26/facebook-just-launched-open-registrations. Twitter
was released in mid-2oo6. Michael Arrington, Odeo Releases Twttr, TECHCRUNCH (July
15, 20o6), http://techerunch.Com/2oo6/o7/15/is -twttr -interesting. As of December 2011,
Facebook had 8oo million active users and Twitter had 1oo million active users. Shea
Bennett, Facebook, Twitter, Linkedn- The Social Media Statistics of Today, MEDIA
BISTRO (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/social-media-
statistics-b17188.
285 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky wrote, "A place should be found to be a public forum...
if it is an important place for the communication of messages and there are not strong
reasons for closing it to speech." Chemerinsky, supra note io8, at 1144. He also wrote,
"Courts can find a tradition of availability to speech based on the use of that general type of
property for expressive purposes. Even some incompatibility with the usual functioning of
the place can be tolerated so as to accommodate First Amendment values.... Although a
place's primary purpose may not be for speech, it should be found to be a limited public
forum if the government has opened it to some speech." Id.
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communication during the September 1 1 th terrorist attacks, in
addition to the fact that BART maintains its intent to provide "1oo
percent" seamless coverage .2 6 Therefore, Internet access via cell
phone service on BART trains and underground platforms would most
likely be a designated "open" public forum that,23 7 although it does not
need to stay open indefinitely, is still subject to reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions, as well as content and viewpoint-
neutrality. 88
3. Reasonable "Place " Restrictions
The antennae that provided cell phone service for BART was
disconnected, cutting off all Internet access within BART trains and
stations.23 9 Cell service aboveground was unaffected.29 In this
manner, BART spatially limited the metaphysical public forum of the
Internet, as individuals could still access the forum outside of BART
286 See discussion of wiring the BART system for Internet access, supra text accompanying
notes 43-46.
287 This is the most logical conclusion despite the conceptual disparity between the Internet
access policy and the speech restrictions on the train platform. A rider on the train is
subject to the ban on expressive activity in paid areas (see supra Part II.B; Expressive
Activities Policy, supra note 51) and yet encouraged to use the cell phone service to have
unlimited access to the Internet (see supra Part II.A; BART Expands Wireless to
Downtown Oakland, supra note 48). Conceivably, a rider can comply with both, if he only
receives speech-rather than creates speech-on the Internet. Unlike any other type of
communicative technology however, the Internet has blurred the line between creating
speech and receiving speech, so this attempt to reconcile these two policies, one targeted at
physical use-restrictions and the other at the metaphysical, by differentiating between
creation and receipt of speech can appear counterintuitive. BART's Internet access policy
itself does not distinguish between creating and receiving speech; it encourages its use to
"work or socialize" by "talk, text and ... web," which by necessity involves both creating
and receiving speech. BART Expands Wireless to Downtown Oakland, supra note 48.
288 See Zick, supra note 275, at 23 ("For the first time, governments ... will provide and
control the backbone of a communications network over which vast amounts of public
communications will flow.... Putting wireless clouds in the sky is like building a public
road solely for communicative purposes. This is much more akin to providing an
expressive forum than a mere public utility." (emphasis in original)).
289 Letter From BART, supra note 69.
290 Id. Aboveground cell service is provided by private cell phone companies through cell
phone towers. Marshall Brain, Jeff Tyson and Julia Layton, How Cell Phones Work,
HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, http://electronies.howstuffworks.com/cell-phonero.htm (last
visited Mar. 29, 2014).
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property. BART's primary objective was to avoid overcrowding the
train platforms, and accomplished this by eliminating the protesters'
ability to coordinate within the BART stations. Their method did not
restrict the Internet itself, nor did it affect the protesters' ability to
communicate outside of BART stations. The Court would likely find
that, because BART was able to achieve its goal without overbroad
restrictions, the shutdown was a reasonable action, but whether BART
met the other elements of the doctrine is less certain.
4. Content- or Viewpoint-Based Intent
BART implemented the shutdown of cell phone service with
explicit reference to the impending protest they were intending to
prevent.291 As the Court stated in Ward, the content-neutrality prong
is analyzed based on whether the state has adopted the regulation
"because of disagreement with the message it conveys," making the
government's purpose the "controlling consideration. '"292 The stated
purpose of the action was to address the safety concerns that a protest
of the expected size would present.2 93 It would be hard to predict how
BART would react in response to an unruly pro-BART protest in its
stations, but the simultaneous pro-BART staging of "loyal riders" at a
news conference on August 11, 2011, appears to indicate that BART
may have been motivated by concerns other than safety.294 Johnson,
the BART spokesperson, also approached local television stations to
try to convince them not to air coverage of the protests,2 95 indicating
that Johnson was compelled to avoid bad press, rather than by
concerns for safety.296 In Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 297 Justice
291 See supra text accompanying notes 62-68.
292 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
293 "BART's top priority is to ensure the safety of its passengers." Letter From BART, supra
note 69.
294 For analysis arguing BART's actions were content-based, see Spencer, supra note 101, at
777-80. For analysis arguing BART's actions were content-neutral, see Fleming, supra note
232, at 638-41.
295 Media Manipulation Strategy, supra note 79.
296 One constitutional scholar argues that the Court should presume the suppression of
speech was viewpoint-based because the protesters intended to condemn BART police. See
Ammori, BART SF 4, supra note 219 ("[C]ourts likely would (or should) presume that a
government agency is making an 'effort to suppress expression' out of disagreement with
the speaker's view when the speakers' view is to criticize that very government agency.
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Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated, "the mere assertion of a
content-neutral purpose [is not] enough to save a law which, on its
face, discriminates based on content. '"293 A court could point to several
pieces of evidence demonstrating BART's intent to restrict based on
viewpoint when it shut down cell phone service.299
Further, it may not matter whether a court can find content-
neutrality in BART's actions. If the Court determines that BART's
action is a content-neutral restriction, the shutdown may still be
found unconstitutional based on other elements of the doctrine.
Though the standard for ample alternative channels has typically been
easy to meet, 300 the protest speech failed to occur altogether, and even
non-protesters, riders on trains and platforms, were unable to
communicate through the closed forum. No other channel of
communication existed for the protesters who had anticipated
meeting on the platform at 5 p.m. that day.301 Additionally, narrow
tailoring requires that the means chosen do not "burden substantially
more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests."302 A court would not likely find that it was a necessary
burden on speech to power down cell phone service across the entire
transit system, especially in light of the fact that BART ultimately did
Here, the protestors were specifically protesting BART's policies and actions. They would
use phones to organize the assembly; this kind of demonstration, common around the
world, even has a term: a 'flash mob."') (emphasis in original).
297 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Comme'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
298 Id. at 642-43. But see generally Strauss, supra note 197.
299 For example, the BART spokesperson staged a news conference attempting to highlight
"loyal riders" reading a prewritten script, or that he tried to discourage news coverage of
the anticipated protest. See supra text accompanying notes 77-83.
300 See discussion of ample alternative channels of communication, supra Part III.E.
301 No channel existed for the protesters to communicate by the time they arrived at the
stations, as they were expecting to have cell phone service to access the Internet, and
because they did not have a makeshift method to reach each other. Though, it is possible of
course for the protesters, as they did in future protests, to skip this step and meet up on the
platform without having to check last-minute instructions through the Internet. The
protesters also could have left the station to reacquire a cell signal, but even had they done
that, it seems they were not able to reorganize themselves since no protest ultimately
occurred. For additional discussion of how BART did not satisfactorily 'leave open
adequate alternative channels," see Fleming, supra note 232, at 646-48.
302 Turner, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799
(1989)).
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employ several alternate methods to address the safety concerns
without the deafening impact on speech,3o3 such as increasing the
number of police officers.3o4 Revealingly, the BART president said
after the incident, "If we were faced with the exact same situation, we
would not shut off cell phone service. We would arrest people."3o5
If the Court finds that the shutdown was content- or viewpoint-
based, it would likely fail strict scrutiny because such an action would
be presumptively invalid and BART did not sufficiently narrowly tailor
its actions. Its staged news conference,30 6 coupled with other public
statements and actions by BART officials, evinces a viewpoint-based
intent against the anti-BART protesters. Additionally, BART's
reactions to subsequent protests, including shutting down entire
stations3o7 or deploying additional police officers and personnel, show
that BART had other measures that would have not affected speech
through the Internet. Thus, its shutdown was not necessary to serve a
compelling interest.3o3 BART's shutdown of Internet access to thwart
a protest was unconstitutional because BART had provided a
designated "open" public forum that was likely closed due to content-
or viewpoint-based intent, or alternatively, was closed in such a way
that placed an overly broad burden on speech without providing
''ample alternative means of communication."
303 In a case where a speaker on a sidewalk had started to attract hecklers, Justice Black
argued that the police had an obligation to protect his "constitutional right to talk." Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 326-28 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting). He wrote, "in the name of
preserving order, [the police] first must make all reasonable efforts to protect him. Here
the policemen did not even pretend to try to protect petitioner.... Their duty was to
protect petitioner's right to talk, even to the extent of arresting the man who threatened to
interfere. Instead, they shirked that duty and acted only to suppress the right to speak." Id.
304 Poeter, supra note 257. BART increased the number of police officers and other
personnel on call and even shut down entire stations for future protests. Temporary
Wireless Service Interruption, supra note 73.
305 Shutdown Rules Adopted, supra note 104.
306 See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
307 See supra text accompanying notes 99, 257-58.
308 But see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 781 (1989), where a musical
performer challenged New York City's policy to furnish the sound equipment and a sound
technician for all performances on the basis that it violated the First Amendment "because
it [would] place[] unbridled discretion in the hands of city officials charged with enforcing
it." Id. at 793. The Court concluded that the city need not find the 'least intrusive means of
achieving the desired end," and that restrictions "are not invalid simply because there is
some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech." Id. at 786, 797
(internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 10:1
GENG
D. The Train Platform with an Internet Overlay
Another possible method to analyze the incident is to apply
BART's restrictive Expressive Activities Policy in conjunction with its
unrestricted Internet access policy. The incident could be analyzed
based on how the two policies overlap. In other words, BART's
unrestricted Internet access policy can be viewed such that it does not
override the ban on expressive activity. The policy is targeted
primarily at physical potentially disruptive activities, and states "No
person shall conduct or participate in assemblies or demonstrations,
distribute written pamphlets or other materials, gather petition
signatures or register voters, or engage in other expressive
activities."309 The goal of the policy is "[t]o prevent interference and
obstruction with the District's primary transportation responsibilities
and to protect its facilities." The result of such a reading would likely
be that a BART rider could engage in any expressive activity through
the Internet as long as the rider was not planning a protest in a BART
paid area.
Briefly setting aside the fact that the unrestricted Internet access
policy was implemented subsequent to BART's more restrictive
Expressive Activities Policy-which by the principles of last-in-time
interpretation would mean that the new unrestricted policy would
overwrite the older restrictive policy where they conflict-a court
could arguably find that BART's Internet access constitutes a limited
public forum, because speech was restricted by the Expressive
Activities Policy, as BART's president attempted to argue.310 A limited
public forum allows the government to exclude speakers based on
their subject matter, as long as it is reasonable and viewpoint-
neutral.311 As BART would argue, its actions were reasonable because
it merely closed the forum of Internet access to enforce its Expressive
Activities Policy. Unlike the limited public forum of the train
platforms,32 where the restrictions were clearly set forth based on
physical boundaries within BART property, however, this limited
public forum does not nearly have sufficiently clear lines of content
309 Expressive Activities Policy, supra note 51.
310 See Letter From BART, supra note 69, and discussion of BART's justifications for the
shutdown, supra note 85.
311 See supra Part III.C.3.
312 See supra Part IV.B.
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prohibition. Even assuming a BART rider was aware that he could
engage in all expressive activity over the Internet, except to organize a
protest in BART paid areas, however, BART shuttered all access to
target a small amount of speech going through the Internet over three
hours, which excluded speech that "[fell] within the [predetermined]
subject matter constraints of the forum," 313 such as ordinary non-
incitement text messages going through cell phone service. This would
"subject [BART's actions] to strict scrutiny,"314 a test it would probably
fail because the shutdown was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the
specific speech at issue.
The very counterintuitive approaches used above to frame the
incident-in order for it to fit neatly into the public forum doctrine-
convincingly demonstrate that it is past due time for a refresh.
V. REFRESHING THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE FOR THE INTERNET ERA
Unsurprisingly, the Internet has thrown a wrench into the gears of
the public forum doctrine. While the doctrine has been fraying in
several respects prior to the Internet, the BART shutdown of cell
phone service has further exposed some very foundational flaws. If
analyzed conventionally, the shutdown was a valid restriction on
speech because the government clearly set forth its intent to create a
limited forum, one that was not open to the protesters. The shutdown
was merely the enforcement of BART's intent to limit speech.
However, the action was immediately greeted with vehement criticism
that it was a clear violation of freedom of speech, no doubt buoyed by
the recent example of Egypt shutting down the Internet to suppress
speech. If analyzed with the significance of the Internet in mind, the
shutdown was unconstitutional because the government restricted
speech in a designated open public forum and was motivated by
content- or viewpoint-based intent.
The contradictory conclusions between these two modes of
analysis demonstrate a severe deficiency in the protections provided
by the First Amendment as it is currently cast in jurisprudence. As
Justice Kennedy wrote in his concurrence in ISKCON, "[O]ur failure
to recognize the possibility that new types of government property
313 Lidsky, supra note 134, at 1989 (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666, 677 (1998)("If the government excludes a speaker who falls within a class to
which a designated public forum is made generally available, its action is subject to strict
scrutiny.")).
314 Id.
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may be appropriate forums for speech will lead to a serious
curtailment of our expressive activity."315 One way to resolve this issue
with the public forum doctrine would be to simply dispense with the
ironclad definition of "traditional" and apply it to the Internet. The
Court declines to include publicly-owned property other than
sidewalks, streets, and parks to this category,1 6 but when society has
overwhelmingly selected a new technology to be the norm for speech,
it is time to break out of the bounds of traditionalism and time
immemorial.317 Justice Kennedy's concurrence continues to
reverberate loudly for the instant case. He wrote:
One of the places left in our mobile society that is
suitable for discourse is a metropolitan airport. It is of
particular importance to recognize that such spaces are
public forums because in these days an airport is one of
the few government-owned spaces where many persons
have extensive contact with other members of the
public. [I]t is critical that we preserve these areas for
protected speech. In my view, our public forum
doctrine must recognize this reality, and allow the
creation of public forums that do not fit within the
narrow tradition of streets, sidewalks, and parks. We
have allowed flexibility in our doctrine to meet
changing technologies in other areas of constitutional
interpretation, and I believe we must do the same with
the First Amendment. 318
It would, however, be unwise to continue to retrofit the public
forum doctrine for the Internet era, because even though it
315 ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
316 See Opening Public Spaces Online, supra note 220, at 1809.
317 Justice Kennedy has given significant credence to this idea. He wrote in his concurrence
to ISKCON: 'The jurisprudence is rooted in historic practice, but it is not tied to a narrow
textual command limiting the recognition of new forums. [We must] recognize that open,
public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable for discourse may be public forums,
whatever their historical pedigree and without concern for a precise classification of the
property.... Without this recognition our forum doctrine retains no relevance in times of
fast-changing technology and increasing insularity." ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 697 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
318 Id. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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purportedly contains categories,319 those categories are far from clear-
cut in their application.32o Instead of attempting to draw lines between
what end up being fluid categories and getting muddled in the
nomenclature, the doctrine should be overhauled to better align with
social norms and public expectations. Justice Blackmun once pointed
out in a dissenting opinion that the public forum doctrine was meant
to balance "the interests served by the expressive activity ... against
the interests served by the uses for which the property was intended
and the interests of all citizens to enjoy the property."321 Instead, he
wrote, the Court has "turn[ed] these principles on end. . . . Rather
than [balancing,] the Court simply labels the property and dispenses
with the balancing."322 In 1972, Justice Marshall wrote, "The right to
use a public place for expressive activity may be restricted only for
weighty reasons."323 The BART cell phone shutdown highlights that
the public forum doctrine has lost its way from the original intent of
the free speech clause.324
A. New Media, New Law
The Court wrote in 1969, "differences in the characteristics of new
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them."325 In what could be viewed as acknowledgement of the
319 Justice Kennedy wrote, "[The public forum doctrine] leaves the government with almost
unlimited authority to restrict speech on its property by doing nothing more than
articulating a nonspeech-related purpose for the area, and it leaves almost no scope for the
development of new public forums absent the rare approval of the government." Id. at 694-
95 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
32o See supra Part III.C.
321 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 813, 820-21 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
322 Id.
323 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
324 Justice Kennedy wrote, "Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of
categories rather than ideas or convert what was once an analysis protective of expression
into one which grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat. I believe that the
Court's public forum analysis in these cases is inconsistent with the values underlying the
Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment." ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 693-94
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
325 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (in the
context of broadcasting as a medium affected by First Amendment interests). See also
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inadequacies of current First Amendment jurisprudence to handle the
Internet, the Court stated in ALA, "we would hesitate to import 'the
public forum doctrine ... wholesale into' the context of the Internet.
[W]e are wary of the notion that a partial analogy in one context, for
which we have developed doctrines, can compel a full range of
decisions in such a new and changing area."'326
Today, the Court already examines the forum's purpose to
determine what category of forum it belongs in, though because of the
rigidity of the public forum doctrine, it has not played a prominent
part in the analysis.327 The key weaknesses of the public forum
doctrine are its reliance on government intent at creation of the forum
and the arbitrary distinctions between forums. Both aspects combine
to give excess discretion to the government actor, fail to protect
speech, and ultimately force the court to deviate beyond the original
balancing test envisioned by the First Amendment and best
articulated in Grayned v. City of Rockford.323 To address these
weaknesses, the Court, in concurrences and dissents, has proposed
various versions of a compatibility test, whereby the court would
identify the forum, be it physical or metaphysical, bypass the "which
forum does this fall under?" question, and immediately ask the
government to prove that the speech being restricted is incompatible
to the forum. With this doctrine, the court need not label the forum
"traditional," or "designated," or "limited," and there is a greater
emphasis on the purpose of the forum.
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) ("Each [medium] is a law unto itself.") (Jackson,
J., concurring).
326 ALA, 539 U.S. 194, 207, n. 3 (2003) (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecomm'n Consortium
v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996)).
327 This method of analysis has hinged on whether "the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." See
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116. Justice Blackmun has criticized the public forum doctrine for
losing its way in this manner: "Where an examination of all the relevant interests indicates
that certain expressive activity is not compatible with the normal uses of the property, the
First Amendment does not require the government to allow that activity.... Rather than
taking the nature of the property into account in balancing the First Amendment interests
of the speaker and society's interests in freedom of speech against the interests served by
reserving the property to its normal use, the Court simply labels the property and
dispenses with the balancing." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 820-21
(1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
328 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116 (' The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.").
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In ISKCON, Justice Kennedy wrote, "[J]f our public forum
jurisprudence is to retain vitality, we must recognize that certain
objective characteristics of Government property and its customary
use by the public may control the status of the property."329 This
different type of approach has been suggested by at least ten Justices,
urging that the right to use public property for expressive purposes
should turn on whether the speech is compatible with the normal
functions of property.330 This view of incompatibility still centers on
the government's intended use of the forum and "inevitably works in
favor of the government because it depends on the government's own
definition of the proper uses of a forum and provides no mechanism
for judicial scrutiny of the government's choices."331 The Court
currently presumes that the burden to prove compatibility is on the
speaker, whereas Justice Kennedy has suggested turning this
formulation on its head: speech on government property is
presumptively protected unless the government proves that the
speech interferes "in a significant way" with the government's use of
the property. 332 This approach harkens back to the 1972 case Grayned
v. City of Rockford, where Justice Marshall wrote, "The crucial
question is whether the manner of expression is basically
329 ISKCON1, 505 U.S. at 693-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
330 Norman T. Deutsch, Does Anybody Really Need a Limited Public Forum?, 82 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 107, 119 (2008) (citing to ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 694-703 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment, joined on this point by Blackmun, J., Stevens, J., and Souter,
J.); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 860 (Brennan,
J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 54-55 (1966)
(Douglas, J., joined by Warren, C.J., Brennan, J., and Fortas, J., dissenting)). See ISKCON,
505 U.S. at 711 ("We should classify as a public forum any piece of public property that is
"suitable for discourse" in its physical character, where expressive activity is 'compatible'
with the use to which it has actually been put.") (Souter, J., concurring).
331 Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1535, 156o-63 (1998).
332 ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 699 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Gey, supra note 331, at 156o-63
("Kennedy thus abandon's the Court's emphasis on whether speech is 'incompatible' with
the government's own stated objectives, in favor of an 'interference' analysis with the
burden now shifted to the government and the presumption running in favor of speech.").
See also Adderley, 385 U.S. at 49-51 (' The jailhouse.. .is one of the seats of governments.
. [I]t is an obvious center for protest.... Those who do not control television and radio,
those who cannot afford to advertise in newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets may
have only a more limited type of access to public officials. Their methods should not be
condemned as tactics of obstruction and harassment as long as the assembly and petition
are peaceable.") (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time."333
In ISKCON, Justice Kennedy further suggested, "the inquiry must
be an objective one, based on the actual, physical characteristics and
uses of the property."334 This approach removes governmental intent,
thereby resolving the situation where the government can suppress
speech based on what type of forum it has created at the outset. 335 For
example, referring to the ISKCON case, he explained that with
adequate time, place, and manner restrictions in place, "expressive
activity is quite compatible with the uses of major airports.
[w]ithout any apparent interference with its ability to meet its
transportation purposes."336
Few would disagree that one of the core purposes of the Internet is
to facilitate communication and expressive activity, so it would not be
a stretch for the Court to first look at whether speech is incompatible
with a forum's purpose to determine free speech protections. In
addition, as the Internet further solidifies its role as the primary
medium for speech, the public forum doctrine's emphasis on physical
property will necessarily become less salient, or as one constitutional
scholar puts it, "geography and place will become less reliable tools for
restricting access and exposure to information that is harmful,
offensive, or simply irritating."337 The compatibility test, however,
would not advocate for the complete abandonment of the physicality
of a forum; rather, the physical characteristics would factor into
whether it is compatible with speech. Moreover, the compatibility test
would look at the forum more holistically, rather than defining the
forum as just the physical platform or just the metaphysical Internet
access.
333 Grayned, 4o8 U.S. at 116. Grayned also cites to Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Cmty. SchoolDist., 393 U.S. 503, 5o6 (1969) as a "touchstone case ... in which [the Court]
considered the question of how to accommodate First Amendment rights with the 'special
characteristics of the school environment."' Grayned, 4o8 U.S. at 117.
334 ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He wrote, "The Court's error lies in
its conclusion that the public forum status of public property depends on the government's
defined purpose for the property, or on an explicit decision by the government to dedicate
the property to expressive activity." Id.
335 Caplan, supra note 135, at 653.
336 ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 701 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
337 Zick, supra note 275, at 14.
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Restrictions must still maintain narrow tailoring, reasonableness
and content neutrality, leaving open ample alternative means of
communication.338 Courts should further scrutinize whether or not an
alternative channel is truly "ample" to allow speech that would
otherwise be protected in a traditional public forum.
One downside to the compatibility test is that courts may arrive at
very different standards of compatibility, thereby making the doctrine
unpredictable and potentially resulting in varying degrees of scrutiny.
The rigidity of the public forum doctrine meant that the courts would
at least be cabined into a predictable and limited array of possible
results.339 While the flexibility of the compatibility test could be its
weakness, it is nevertheless better suited for modern times because it
accounts for the fact that technology will continue to change how we
communicate and seek avenues for speech. Simultaneously, it adheres
more closely to the original goals of the First Amendment by
minimizing government intent and influence, and arguably, is more
comprehensible to the layman speaker than a complex web of various
forums and standards.
Under a doctrine of compatibility, BART would have to prove that
the protesters' speech was incompatible with the forum. The forum
should be identified as the physical space on the train platform,
combined with the metaphysical Internet access, subject to both the
restrictive policy of the train platform and the unrestricted speech
over the Internet. This test would not have allowed BART to
preemptively suppress speech without a showing that-after it had
exhausted all other methods to contain the impact-the speech would
have imminently impacted BART's transportation purposes. Given the
severe disruptions caused by the July 11 protest, BART may have been
able to make a case that employing more police would have been
insufficient to contain the August 11 protest. Once it has proven that
the speech is incompatible with the forum, however, BART would also
need to prove that its actions maintain content-neutrality and
reasonableness and are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest. The August 11 cell phone shutdown, as discussed
above, probably would not survive strict scrutiny, or satisfy the
content-neutrality requirement.
338 In the 1972 case Grayned v. City of Rockford, Justice Marshall applied reasonableness,
content neutrality and narrow tailoring after determining compatibility, all prior to the
official birth of the public forum doctrine in Perry in 1983. Grayned, 4o8 U.S. at 114-17.
339 However, scholars and courts alike have acknowledged that the doctrine has failed to
produce predictable results. See criticisms of the doctrine, supra note 134.
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B. BART Protests and Beyond
As more government agencies provide publicly available Internet
access, 340 situations will frequently arise where the agencies will face
the choice of whether they should shut down that access to accomplish
a governmental interest. In the future, agencies will probably place
restrictive policies on speech at the outset of providing Internet
access, 341 putting them in the limited public forum category, as BART
has attempted to do with its newly-adopted Cell Service Interruption
Policy.342 Though the policy recognizes that "available open
communications networks are critical to our . . . democracy and
should be preserved to the fullest extent possible," it still permits
BART to restrict the service based on "strong evidence of... unlawful
activity," destruction of property, or "substantial disruption of public
transit services."343 It is arguable that this policy has actually created a
designated "open" public forum, since BART's intent remains to allow
public discourse to occur through their cell phone service, as long as
their restrictions are reasonable. BART may close the designated
"open" public forum if it maintains content and viewpoint-neutrality
during the closure.
If the Court were to adopt a compatibility-based test for free
speech, future interruptions of cell service would require that BART
340 See Sewell Chan, After Delays, Wireless Web Comes to Parks, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.Com/2oo6/o7/o6/nyregion/o6wifi.html. See also Ryan Singel,
Google Chooses Kansas City, Kansas, as Broadband Mecca, WIRED.COM (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2o1/o3/google-fiber-kansas; Jon Bershad, Good
NewslBad News: NYSubways To Get Wi~i and Cell Phone Service, MEDIAITE (July 30,
2010), http://www.mediaite.com/online/good-newsbad-news-ny-subways-to-get -wifi-
and-cell-phone-service; Press Release, NJ Transit, NJ Transit Seeking Wi-Fi for
Customers: Request for Proposals Issued for Provision of Wireless Broadband Service
Onboard Trains and at Rail Stations (Sept. 1, 20o), available at
http://www.njtransit.com/tm/tm servlet.srv?hdnPageAction=PressReleaseTo&PRESSR
ELEASEID=262o.
341 Alternatively, government agencies likely face similar challenges when providing a
virtual platform for speech, such as allowing visitors to comment or post messages through
a government-owned and operated website. See Lidsky, supra note 134; Opening Public
Spaces Online, supra note 22o, at 1816-22; David S. Ardia, Government Speech and
Online Forums: First Amendment Limitations on Moderating Public Discourse on
Government Websites, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1981 (2010).
342 CELL SERVICE INTERRUPTION POLICY, available at
http://www.bart.gov/sites/default/files/does/final-CSIP.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
343 Id.
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prove that use of the Internet would have significantly interfered with
their transportation goals. On August 11, 2011, in other words, BART
would have needed to show that use of the Internet to organize the
protest, and the protest itself, would have significantly impacted train
service despite deploying their best efforts to avoid affecting speech.
Given how the day played out, it is unclear whether the resultant
protest would have caused more or less disruptions than the July 11
protest did.
In September 2013, as a response to the original incident, the
California legislature passed a law344 that prohibits state and local
agencies from "shutting down a public communications network
without a court order," with exceptions for "life-threatening
emergencies."345 The bill became effective on January 1, 2014.346
Under this law, BART might have had difficulty justifying the August
2011 network shutdown.
The year 2011 has become known as "the year of the protest," with
revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen,
demonstrations against economic breakdown in Greece, Italy and
Spain, marches in Chile and Israel, and occupations of parks and
sidewalks for the global Occupy Wall Street, to name a few.347 In such
a context, the BART shutdown of cell phone service may seem trivial.
But, while the shutdown of Internet access did not stop the Egyptian
people from casting aside their dictator, Americans living under the
shadow of the present-day public forum doctrine may not be so lucky
should they choose to voice their dissent as they tried to do on August
11. The First Amendment's protections of free speech are the bedrock
of American democracy, but if the one place that more and more
Americans are turning to for speech can be throttled merely because it
is not traditionally and historically treated as a public forum, then the
First Amendment will have failed to provide any protection at all.
344 S. Bill No. 380 (Cal. 2013), available at
http://eginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/bilINavClient.xhtml?bill-id=201320140SB38o.
345 Bob Egelko, New State Law Prohibits Electronic Network Shutdown, S.F. CHRON.
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/New-state-law-prohibits-
electronic-network-4848252.php.
346 Press Release, Cal. Sen. Alex Padilla, Governor Brown Signs Bill Requiring Court Order
to Interrupt Wireless Communication Services (Sept. 26, 2013), available at
http://sd20.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-09-26-governor-brown-signs-bill-requiring-court-
order-interrupt-wireless -communication -ser.
347 See, e.g., 2011: Your Year in Pictures, BBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/in-pictures-16372561; Harris, supra note 14.
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